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There are many situations in which two or more agents (e.g., human or com-
puter decision makers) interact with each other repeatedly in settings that can be
modeled as repeated games. In such situations, there is evidence that agents some-
times deviate greatly from what conventional game theory would predict. There are
several reasons why this might happen, one of which is the focus of this dissertation:
sometimes an agent’s preferences may involve not only its own payoff (as specified
in the payoff matrix), but also the payoffs of the other agent(s). In such situations,
it is important to be able to understand what an agent’s preferences really are, and
how those preferences may affect the agent’s behavior.
This dissertation studies how the notion of Social Value Orientation (SVO),
a construct in social psychology to model and measure a person’s social preference,
can be used to improve our understanding of the behavior of computer agents. Most
of the work involves the life game, a repeated game in which the stage game is chosen
stochastically at each iteration. The work includes the following results:
• Using a combination of the SVO theory and evolutionary game theory, we
studied how an agent’s SVO affects its behavior in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(IPD). Our analysis provides a way to predict outcomes of agents playing IPD
given their SVO values.
• In the life game, we developed a way to build a model of agent’s SVO based
on observations of its behavior. Experimental results demonstrate that the
modeling technique works well.
• We performed experiments showing that the measured social preferences of
computer agents have significant correlation with that of their human design-
ers. The experimental results also show that knowing the SVO of an agent’s
human designer can be used to improve the performance of other agents that
interact with the given agent.
• A limitation of the SVO model is that it only looks at agents’ preferences in
one-shot games. This is inadequate for repeated games, in which an agent’s
actions may depend on both its SVO and whatever predictions it makes of
the other agent’s behavior. We have developed an extension of the SVO con-
struct called the behavioral signature, a model of how an agent’s behavior over
time will be affected by both its own SVO and the other agent’s SVO. The
experimental results show that the behavioral signature is an effective way to
generalize SVO to situations where agents interact repeatedly.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In game theory, it is generally assumed that all individuals satisfy a set of mathe-
matical assumptions known as decision-theoretic rationality — from which it follows
that an individual’s actions can be regarded as maximizing utility, the “currency”
for everything they want. In an economic context, the rational choice theory gives
rise to the concept of Homo economicus (or economic man) which suggest that the
ideal man is driven by self-interested economic calculation without considering the
consequences on others. It provides the central explanatory principle of many eco-
nomic theories and has generated a vast academic literature. On the other hand,
experiments in social and behavioral sciences show that humans rarely follow this
assumption. For instance, consider the Ultimatum Game, in which two players in-
teract to decide how to divide a sum of money that is given to them. The first
player proposes how to divide the sum between the two players, and the second
player can either accept or reject this proposal. If the second player rejects, neither
player receives anything. If the second player accepts, the money is split according
to the proposal. Existing experiments in this game show that the offers that are
issued or accepted are closer to a “fair” division of the money ($50 for each) than
the “rational” choice [1], and also involved a cultural component [2].
Indeed, it is widely accepted in social and behavioral sciences that players
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explicitly take into account the outcomes for other players when considering their
course of action. The choices people make depend, among other things, on sta-
ble personality differences in the manner in which they approach interdependent
others. This observation can be traced back to the seminal work by Messick and
McClintock [3] in which they presented a motivational theory of choice behavior
that considers both players’ payoffs in game situations. This theory was later called
the Social Value Orientation theory [4]. Most of the SVO based studies typically
recognize two opposing social value orientations: a proself and prosocial orientation.
A proself orientation is one that gives higher consideration to its own payoff, while
a prosocial orientation gives higher regards to the payoff of the agents he is inter-
acting with. The social orientation of a player is not an absolute value; it describes
a spectrum of possible behaviors, in which one end of the spectrum denotes proself
behavior and the other end denotes prosocial behavior. Note that in contrast to the
diversity of the SVO theory, the conventional rationality assumption dictates that
all individuals are proself, without any difference between one and another. As most
social or psychological traits, the claim that SVO is a fundamental personality trait
is supported by both biological and sociological findings [5]. Biological support also
can be found, among others, in Van Lange’s work [6] showing that the basic form
of SVO is visible early in life as part of a child’s temperament.
The purpose of this dissertation is to study how the notion of SVO can be
used to improve our understanding of the behavior of computer agents. Most of the
work involves the life game, a repeated game proposed by Bacharach [7] in which
the stage game is chosen stochastically at each iteration. The results of the work
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are described in following paragraphs.
First, we use a combination of the SVO theory and evolutionary game theory to
study how an agent’s SVO affects its behavior in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD).
Our analysis provides a way to predict outcomes of agents playing IPD given their
SVO values. The evolutionary simulation results on IPD confirm previous findings
on evolution of cooperation, and provide new insights on the evolutionary process of
cooperative behavior in a society as well as on the emergence of cooperative societies.
Second, in the context of life game, we have developed a way to build a model
of agent’s SVO based on observations of its behavior. Our method of agent modeling
can be used to learn strategies and respond to others’ strategies over time, to play the
game well. Our experiments demonstrated that our SVO based agent outperformed
both standard repeated games strategies and a large set of peer designed agents.
Furthermore, our experimental work illustrates the importance of adaptive and fine-
grained opponent modeling, as well as the impacts that different trust adaptation
strategies have on the performance of the SVO agent.
Third, we have developed a way to quantify the social preferences of com-
puter agents, by adapting some concepts and techniques from social psychology.
We performed experiments showing that the measured social preferences of com-
puter agents have significant correlation with that of their human designers. The
experimental results also show that knowing the SVO of an agent’s human designer
can be used to improve the performance of other agents that interact with the given
agent.
Finally, a limitation of the SVO model is that it only looks at agent’s prefer-
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ences in one-shot games. This is inadequate for repeated games, in which an agent’s
actions may depend on both its SVO and whatever predictions it makes of the other
agent’s behavior. To use the SVO model effectively in repeated games, it is neces-
sary to extend the SVO model to take into account how an agent’s behavior will
change if it interacts repeatedly with various other kinds of agents. This dissertation
includes a way to adapt and extend the SVO construct by a behavioral signature, a
model of how an agent’s behavior over time will be affected by both its own SVO
and the other agent’s SVO. The experimental results show that the predictions using
behavioral signatures are highly correlated with the agents’ actual performance in
tournament settings. This shows that the behavioral signature is an effective way
to generalize SVO to situations where agents interact repeatedly.
1.1 Outline of Thesis
The contents of the rest of this dissertation are as follows:
Chapter 2 presents a more detailed description of the Social Value Orientation
(SVO) Theory and the Life Game. The Life Game is the game environment we used
in most of the work (Chapter 4, 5, and 6) in this dissertation.
Chapter 3 utilizes evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of cooper-
ative societies and the behaviors of individual agents in such societies. We present
a novel player model based on the SVO theory. Alongside the formal player model
we provide an analysis that considers possible interactions between different types
of individuals and identifies five general steady-state behavioral patterns.
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Chapter 4 presents an agent model based on the SVO theory. Our method
of agent modeling can be used to learn strategies and respond to others’ strategies
over time, to play the game well. We provide extensive evaluations of our model’s
performance, both against standard agents from the game theory literature and
against a large set of life-game agents written by students in two different countries.
This chapter also suggests some properties for life-game strategies to be successful
in environments with such agents.
Chapter 5 presents a way to measure the social preferences of computer agents,
by adapting some concepts and techniques from social psychology. We perform
experiments to study the correlation between the social preferences of computer
agents and that of their human designers. This chapter also describes how to use
the SVO information of the human designers to improve the performance of other
agents that interact with the given agent.
Chapter 6 presents a way to extend the SVO model to a behavioral signature
that models how an agent’s behavior over multiple iterations will depend on both
its own SVO and the SVO of the agent with which it interacts. This chapter also
provides a way to measure an agent’s behavioral signature, and a way to use this
behavioral signature to predicting the agent’s performance.
The last chapter reviews the contributions of this dissertation and proposes
directions for future work.
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Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
This chapter gives a more detailed description of the Social Value Orientation (SVO)
Theory and the Life Game. The Life Game is the game environment we used in
most of the work (Chapter 4, 5, and 6) in this dissertation. We will also discuss
related work on agent modeling.
2.1 The Social Value Orientation (SVO) Theory
There is a substantial set of evidence from the social and behavioral sciences liter-
ature showing that players explicitly take into account the outcome for the other
player when considering their course of action [5]. Moreover, the choices people make
depend, among other things, on stable personality differences in how they approach
interdependent others. This observation can be traced back to the seminal work by
Messick and McClintock [3] in which they presented a motivational theory of choice
behavior that considers both players’ payoffs in game situations. This theory was
later denoted as the Social Value Orientation theory, which has since developed into
a class of theorems [4].
Most of the SVO based studies typically recognize two opposing social value
orientations: proself and prosocial orientations. A proself orientation is one that
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gives higher consideration to its own payoff; while a prosocial orientation gives
higher regards to the payoff of the agents he or she is interacting with. The social
orientation of a player is not an absolute value; it describes a spectrum of possible
behaviors, in which one end of the spectrum denotes proself behavior, and the
other end denotes prosocial behavior. Analysis of many SVO based experiments
reveal that most people are classified as cooperators (50%), followed by individualists
(24%), followed by competitors (13%) [5, p. 74]. 1
In contrast to the diversity of the SVO theory, the traditional rationality as-
sumption dictates that all individuals are proself, without any difference among
them. As most social or psychological traits, the claim that SVO is a fundamental
personality trait is supported by both biological and sociological findings [5]. Biolog-
ical support also can be found, among others, in Van Lange’s work [6] showing that
the basic form of SVO is visible early in life as part of a child’s temperament. The
development of the SVO from social interactions is supported by many works shown
in Au and Kwong review [5]. The validity of SVO based theorems, shown both in
laboratory and field studies, indicates that prosocial generally cooperate more and
show greater concern for the effect of their actions on the well being of others and
on the environment. For examples, McClintock and Allison [8] shows that proso-
cial students were more willing to contribute time to help others, and Joireman et
al. [9] that shows that prosocial participants tend to take more pro-environmental
and collective policies than self-interest actions.
Over the years, there have been significant advances on social dilemmas and
1The remaining 13% could not be classified as having a consistent SVO.
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various aspects of the social value orientations since the seminal work of Messick
and McClintock [3]. For example, Parks and Rumble [10] showed that different
aspects of the Tit-for-Tat strategy have different effects on the cooperation rates of
individuals with different SVO values. In addition, there were several other research
questions that considered some relaxation of the rationality assumption in their
solution, for instance, de Jong et al. [11] presented a computational model that
allows for achieving fairness in multi-agent systems. Their computational model
uses the Homo Egualis utility function that has been shown to adequately describe
human behavior in several games.
2.2 The Life Game Model
Many multi-agent domains involve human and computer decision makers that are
engaged in repeated collaborative or competitive activities. Examples include on-
line auctions, financial trading, and computer gaming. Repeated games are often
viewed as an appropriate model for studying these kinds of repeated interactions
between agents. In a traditional, game-theoretic repeated-game model, agents re-
peatedly play a game called the stage game. Many types of games can be used as
the stage game. For example, Axelrod’s famous Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)
competitions showed the emergence of cooperation, even though the rational domi-
nant equilibrium in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma is to defect [12]. Maynard Smith
studied two-player Chicken Game with a population of Hawks and Doves [13], and
Skyrms studied the evolved population when individuals were playing the Stag-hunt
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game [14].
Each of these studies used a highly simplified game model in which the same
stage game was used at every iteration. In other words, they assumed that the
agents would interact with each other repeatedly in exactly the same environment.
However, as pointed out by Bacharach [7, p. 100], repeatedly playing the same
game is unlikely to be an accurate model of any individual’s life. In many real-life
situations, agents may interact with each other repeatedly in different environments.
As a more accurate model, Bacharach proposed the Life Game, in which an
individual plays a mixture of games drawn sequentially according to some stochastic
process from many stage games. Bacharach referred to the size and variety of this
set as the game’s ludic diversity (thus an ordinary non-stochastic repeated game
has minimal ludic diversity). The rich variety of stage games also allows agents to
express a larger spectrum of social preferences, resulting in an adequate playground
for agents of different personalities and behaviors. We believe this makes the Life
Game a better model for repeated interaction in different environments—so in this
dissertation we concentrate on studying social preferences of automated agents in
the Life Game of high ludic diversity.
In this dissertation, we model the life game as an iterated game in which
each stage game is a 2x2 normal-form game that is generated randomly by choosing
independent random values for the payoffs a, b, c, and d in the payoff matrix shown in
Figure 2.1. The payoffs a, b, c, d are chosen from a uniform distribution over the set
[0, 9]. At each stage, each agent knows the complete payoff matrix. After deciding





A1 (a, a) (b, c)
Player 1
A2 (c, b) (d, d)
Figure 2.1: Stage game for the life game. The values a, b, c, d are generated randomly




A1=Left (1, 1) (0, 0)
Player 1
A2=Right (0, 0) (1, 1)
Figure 2.2: Choosing the side of the road upon which to drive.
The two agents will play the games in succession, without knowing when the series
of games will end. We do not place any restrictions on the agents’ memory, and
they may record past matrices and the actions taken by both agents and use it in
their strategy.
Depending on the randomly chosen values of a, b, c, and d, each stage game
may or may not be an instance of a well-known social dilemma game (e.g., Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Chicken Game, Stag-Hunt [15], etc). Consequently, the semantics of the
actions are subjective and depend on the value of a, b, c and d. For example, if
a = 3, b = 0, c = 5 and d = 1 (a Prisoner’s Dilemma), then A1 and A2 can
be considered as “Cooperate” and “Defect.” This additional layer of uncertainty
might cause situation such as that when one agent considers a certain action to be
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a reasonably cooperative action, it will be captured as a competitive action in the
eyes of its opponent. Some instances (e.g., Figure 2.2) of the random games may not
have the notion of cooperation at all. Therefore, in addition to induce cooperation,
a good agent also needs to coordinate well with other agent in some of the games.
2.3 Related Work
Previous research in agent modeling has proposed modeling other agents by esti-
mating agents’ personalities. For example, Talman et al. [16] proposed a decision-
theoretic model that explicitly represents and reasons about agents’ personalities in
environments in which agents are uncertain about each others’ resources. Similar
to our SVO-based models, their agents can identify and negotiate with those who
are cooperative while avoiding those who are exploiter. Ya’akov Gal et al. [17] pro-
posed several new decision-making models that represent, learn and adapt to various
social attributes that influence people’s decision-making in a group of human and
computer agents.
Previous works on the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma typically used a policy to
model an agent [18–21]. A policy is a set of rules specifying the choice of C or D in
every round as a function of the history of the interaction so far. For example, well-
known strategies such as the famous tit-for-tat strategy [12] and Pavlov strategy [22]
can be modeled using the policy. However, extending the policy model to the life
game, which allows variations of interactions, raises the following difficulties. First,
from the semantic point of view, unlike the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which actions
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are labeled by “Cooperate” or “Defect”, in the life game the actions are not labeled
in advance. The agents will need to define themselves the semantic of each of the
actions in each round of the game. Consequently, the intentions behind the actions
might be misinterpreted due to semantic differences, which also complicates the
playing strategies. For example, what might look like a “Cooperate” action for one
agent, might be interpreted differently by another. Secondly, the semantic problems
might also result in ambiguity with respect to the intentions behind the actions, as
the agent cannot be sure whether an action is a result of an intentional strategic
decision, or due to semantic differences. On the contrary, our SVO-based models do
not require labeling actions in advance.
In most of the work (Chapter 4, 5, and 6) in this dissertation, in order to
provide a richer set of strategies to perform experiments, we collected a large set of
Peer Designed Agents (PDAs). Peer-Designed Agents have been recently used with
great success in AI to evolve and evaluate state-of-the-art agents for various tasks
such as negotiation and collaboration [23–25]. Lin et al. [23] provided an empirical
proof that PDAs can alleviate the evaluation process of automatic negotiators, and
help their designs. Efrat Manisterski et al. [24] studied how people design agents
for online markets and how their design changes over time. Their results show
that most human subjects modified their agents’ strategic behavior; for example,
they increased their means of protection against deceiving agents. Au et al. [25]
used agents written by students to study enhancing agent by combining a set of
interaction traces produced by other agents. In most of the work in this dissertation,
we used the same evaluation methodology that we collected a set of human-written
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agents and then investigate a better model and way to predict their behaviors and
have better interactions with them.
While using PDA’s instead of human is very attractive, there are also limi-
tations that must be taken into account. Elmalech and Sarne in [26] showed that
there are limitations for the ability to generalize results from one successful imple-
mentation of PDA-based systems to another. As such, the decision to prefer working
with PDAs instead of humans must dependent on the domain in question. Another
interesting result from the same authors suggests that the process of developing a
programmable strategy for a PDA might affect the behavior of its designer. There
are also some evidence of discrepancies between actual and reported human behav-
ior in various domains, in particular in metacognition research [27], however overall
the sum of evidence do show that PDA designers do manage to describe their strat-
egy in a way that reflects their real-life strategy. The work in this dissertation has
very limited exposure to these weaknesses of the PDA methodology, as most of our
results are, at least theoretically, independent from any specific domain.
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Chapter 3: Social Value Orientation Theory and Evolution of Coop-
eration
In this Chapter, we utilize a combination of SVO theory and evolutionary game
theory to study the evolution of cooperative societies and the behaviors of individual
agents (i.e., players) in such societies. We present a novel player model based on
the SVO theory. Alongside our formal player model we provide an analysis that
considers possible interactions between different types of individuals and identifies
five general steady-state behavioral patterns. We present evolutionary simulations
that confirm previous findings on evolution of cooperation, and provide new insights
on the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a society as well as on the
emergence of cooperative societies.
3.1 Introduction
We consider how cooperative societies evolve, given varying social tendencies of the
individuals. Evolution of cooperation between individuals has been studied for years,
most notably starting from the seminal work of Smith [28] and Axelrod [29]. The
underlying question can be summarized briefly as follows:
Why and how does cooperative behavior evolve in a Darwinian society
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where the survival of the fittest is the prominent behavioral rule?
Existing research on this question typically utilize game theory in order to analyze
highly simplified models of social dilemmas. Traditional game theory uses the ra-
tionality assumption, i.e., the assumption that human behavior is purely rational,
self-maximizing behavior [30]. However, this assumption has received wide criti-
cism from the behavioral science literature (e.g. [1]). For example, the Social Value
Orientation (SVO) theory [3, 4] conjectures based on many empirical studies, that
the social choices people make depend, among other things, on other people; in
particular on the stable personality differences between individuals.
We describe a new formalism for studying evolution of cooperation based on
the SVO theory. Our formalism captures in the player models the notion of varying
and persistent social orientations exhibited in human behavior. This enables a player
to reason about the relationships between the player’s social orientation and how
that player develops strategies when two players interact repeatedly in a game for
an unknown number of times.
We present theoretical results showing how players with different social ten-
dencies interact in a class of normal-form games. Our analysis revealed five general
stable state behavioral patterns that can be explained in terms of the players’ vary-
ing social orientation values.
Our experiments based on evolutionary simulations in the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (IPD) demonstrated the effects of social orientations on the evolution of
cooperative behavior in individual players and on the emergence of a cooperative
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society. One set of experiments showed that prosocial tendency increases with in-
creasing reward or with decreasing temptation, thus confirming previous intuitions
from [31].
In our experiments, we also found out that there are scenarios in which the
definition of cooperativeness from previous studies might lead to erroneous conclu-
sions. Previous works on the evolution of cooperation typically used the average
payoff of the society as a measure of of its cooperativeness: i.e., the higher the aver-
age payoff is, the more cooperative the society is thought to be [18–20]. However, it
does not happen in our model that while increasing the value of rewards or punish-
ments results in a similar increase in the average payoff, this does not result in the
emergence of the same kind of society. In particular in our experiments, increasing
mutual reward typically resulted in a cooperative society, but increasing mutual
punishment resulted in a divided society that includes two distinct clusters: one of
highly selfish players and the other of highly cooperative players.
3.2 Evolution of Cooperation
The studies for evolution of cooperation investigate how and under what conditions
individuals who pursue their own self-interest can cooperate with each other with-
out a central authority to force them to do so. Among the prominent approaches
to understanding the nature of cooperation is evolutionary game theory, which uses
evolutionary concepts such as fitness, replication and mutation to explain the emer-




Cooperate (C) Defect (D)
Cooperate (C) (3, 3) (0, 5)
Player 1
Defect (D) (5, 0) (1, 1)
Figure 3.1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Normal-form games are typically used to abstract many details at arise in
situations where cooperation among individuals are to be studied. The most widely-
used example of such games is the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), an iterated
variant of the prisoner’s dilemma that is played repeatedly an unknown number of
iterations. IPD has been the most common model for social dilemmas between two
players and has been often used in order to study the evolution of cooperation.
Figure 3.1 presents the payoff matrix for Prisoner’s Dilemma, where two play-
ers are both faced with a decision to either cooperate (C) or defect (D). If the game
is played once, then defecting will provide a higher payoff regardless of whether the
other player cooperates or defects. However, if the game is played repeatedly for an
unknown number of times, cooperative behavior in an individual might emerge to
increase accumulated payoffs (see [32] for an overview).
Since Axelrod’s IPD tournament [12] that focused on generating winning
strategies in IPD, there has been a large body of research on the various aspects of
the basic IPD model: varying payoffs, number of players, and various population
and structural dynamics [32].




Cooperate (C) Defect (D)
Cooperate (C) (R,R) (S, T )
Player 1
Defect (D) (T, S) (P, P )
Figure 3.2: Generalized form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where S < P < R <
T and 2R > S + T .
(Figure 3.2, where S < P < R < T and 2R > S + T ). In the subsequent sections,
we describe a new formalism based on the SVO theory, for studying evolution of
cooperation. Previous works on the evolution of cooperation typically used the
average payoff of the population as a measure of the cooperativeness [18–20]. In
contrast, our formalism focuses on the social value orientations of the players and
uses the average social values of the society as a new measure of cooperativeness.
3.3 Our Model
We formalize the social-interaction space of the two players in a game, namely Player
x and Player y, as a two-dimensional Euclidean space, as illustrated in Figure 3.3.
The x-axis represents the accumulated total payoff of Player x and the y-axis rep-
resents that of Player y.
The social-orientation of a player, say Player x, is a unit vector ŝx such that
ŝx’s initial point is at the origin of the social-interaction space. We represent ŝx by
the angle, θ(x) between ŝx and the x-axis of the social-interaction space. Intuitively,
the social orientation of a player is a model of its tendency to adopt a prosocial or
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Figure 3.3: An Illustration of the social-interaction space of two players, x and y.
The x and y axes show the accumulated total payoff for Players x and y, respectively.
proself behavior in a game.
For example, when θx = 0 then Player x acts as a proself individual. If
θx = π/4, then this means that player is fair, i.e., it acts to balance the accumulated
total payoffs of two players. When θx = π/2, the player is purely prosocial, i.e., it
never attempts to maximize its own payoff, but rather it tries to increase the payoff
of the other player.
We define the state of the repeated game at any iteration point t as a vector
in the social-interaction space:
~gt = 〈px, py〉
where px is the accumulated total payoff that Player x receives from the start of the
game to the point t and py is that of Player y. Note that both players hold the same
game state that describes their accumulated total payoff, and it is the only variable
state that players remember and use for deciding what to do next.
Suppose Player x, takes an action, C or D, in the game, and Player x assumes
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Player y is a random player. Let ~gt be the current game state. There are two
possible expected state changes that can arise depending whether Player x takes the
action C or D:














Intuitively, the state ~pC is the expected change in the game state produced by the
average of the payoffs that Player x could get by playing C, given Player y chooses C
or D uniformly at random. This definition assumes that Player x’s model of Player
y is of a random player. In other words, Player x does not have any background
knowledge about the other player and it cannot store and learn from the other
player’s actions.
The expected successor game state, ~gt+1,A, given that Player x chooses an action
a ∈ {C,D} in the current game state ~gt is
~gt+1,A = ~gt + ~pA,
where ~pA is the expected amount of change in the state by doing an action A.
During the course of the game, each player aims to bring the game state closer
to its social-orientation vector, ŝx. In other words, each player aims to change the
game state based on its social preference. The differences between the orientations
of the players create the tensions in their social interactions – hence the social
dilemmas. Note that with the traditional rationality assumption, the players will
try to do utility-maximization on their own payoff. In other words, the theta equals
to zero and social orientation equals to 〈1, 0〉.
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We formalize the expected utility of a game state ~gt+1,A based on social orien-
tations of players as follows. Let ~gt be the current game state. The objective of
each player is to minimize the in-between angle δt,A (where A ∈ {C,D}) between
its own social-orientation vector ŝ (ŝx for Player x) and the expected utility vector
~gt+1,A = ~gt + ~pA. In other words, the utility of a game state ~gt+1,A for Player x can




, A ∈ {C,D}
Thus, at each iteration t of the game, each player will choose an action at such that
at = argmaxA∈{C,D} cos δt,A
For example, consider the well-known Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
as depicted in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.4 shows how a fair player (i.e., θ = π/4) interact




the beginning, ~g = 〈0, 0〉, δ0,C is smaller than δ0,D, therefore, the fair player will
cooperate at the first iteration. When the other player defects at the first iteration,
the game state becomes 〈0, 5〉, and δ1,D is smaller than δ1,C . Therefore, the fair
player defects at the second iteration. When the other player defects again, both
of them get 1 and the game state becomes 〈1, 6〉. δ2,D is smaller than δ2,C again,
therefore, the fair player defects until the other cooperates at some point after which
the payoffs of both players becomes balanced, i.e., ~g = 〈p, p〉 for some p. In other
words, a fair player in IPD game behaves exactly the same as the well-known Tit-
For-Tat (TFT) strategy.
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Figure 3.4: An example reaction of a fair player (Player x)
3.4 Analysis
We are interested in the dynamics of a player’s behaviors (strategies), based on its
social-orientation, over the course of its interaction with another player in a repeated
game. This section presents an exhaustive analysis of such dynamics based on the
model described earlier.
We use the definition for the social-orientation of a player in the following
form. Let the two players be x and y, and their social-orientation angles be θx and







We define the following ratios for each action, C and D, in the Prisoner’s






. Intuitively, these ratios
describe the expected share of payoff that the first player will get by choosing C
and D, respectively. Since S < T (one of the conditions of Prisoner’s Dilemma), we
have rC < 0.5 < rD. In other words, this means that when a player defects, it is
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expected to get a larger share of the total payoff. 1
Let ~g = 〈px, py〉 be the current game state. We define the current ratios for






. In a steady state, Player x cooperates
whenever he is satisfied with his current ratio, i.e., his current ratio is greater than
or equal to his preference ratio (i.e., gx ≥ rx), or defects otherwise. Without loss of
generality, we assume rx ≤ ry. There are five possible cases in steady state:
Theorem 1. If ry ≥ rx > 0.5 (i.e., both are proself), both players always defect and
get P at each game in steady state.
Proof. When gx ≥ rx, Player x cooperates while Player y defects, so gx moves
toward S
S+T








For example, in an IPD game, let rx = 0.6 and ry = 0.7. This means that
Player x will always aim to get a share of 60% of the total payoff, while Player y
will aim to get a share of 70% of the total payoff. Therefore, both will never be
satisfied and will constantly defect to get a payoff of 1.
Theorem 2. If rx ≤ ry ≤ 0.5 (i.e., both are prosocial), both players always cooperate
and get R at each game in steady state.
1S < T is the only assumption required for the analysis. Note that this assumption is not
restrictive: many well-known games satisfy this condition, including the well-known Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Chicken Game, and Stag-Hunt [15].
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Proof. When gx < rx, Player x defects while Player y cooperates, so gx moves
toward T
S+T
> rx. When gx ≥ 1 − ry, Player x cooperates while Player y defects,
so gx moves toward
S
S+T




For example, in an IPD game, let rx = 0.3 and ry = 0.4. This means that
Player x will aim to get a share of 30% of the total payoff, while Player y will aim
to get a share of 40% the total payoff. As such, they will both be easily satisfied,
and therefore always cooperate and get the rewards, i.e., 3.
Theorem 3. If rx < 0.5 and rx + ry = 1, there are two cases:
• when ry > TS+T , Player x gets S while Player y gets T ;
• otherwise, Player x gets rx(T + S), and Player y gets (1− rx)(T + S).




we will have the repeated sequence of Cooperate-Defect actions in all interaction
traces.
The proof for the second case is as follows. When gx < rx, Player x defects
while Player y cooperates, so gx moves toward
T
S+T
> rx. When gx ≥ rx, Player x
cooperates while Player y defects, so gx moves toward
S
S+T
< rx. In steady state,
they interact in a way that the ratio rx (and ry as well) is achieved, so Player x gets
rx(T + S) while Player y gets T + S − rx(T + S).
For example, in an IPD game, let rx = 0.4 and ry = 0.6. This means that
Player x will always aim to get a share of 40% of the total payoff, while Player y
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will aim to get a share of 60% of the total payoff. Therefore, they will try to grasp
the share alternatively. In a steady state, Player x gets 2 and Player y gets 3 at
each game on average.
Theorem 4. If ry > 1− rx > 0.5, there are two cases:
• when ry > TS+T , Player x gets S while Player y gets T ;
• otherwise, Player x gets p̄x = SP−PT(P−T )−(P−S) 1−rx
rx




Proof. The proof for the first case is the same that of Theorem 3 above. The proof
of the second case is as follows. When gx < rx, both players defect and get P . When
gx ≥ rx, Player x cooperates and gets S and Player y defects and gets T . In steady
state, they will get (S, T ) or (P, P ) in each game in a way that rx is achieved. Let
nDD be the portion of the games resulted in DD, Player x gets p̄x and Player y gets
p̄y where p̄x = rx(p̄x + p̄y), p̄x = PnDD +S(1−nDD) and p̄y = PnDD + T (1−nDD).
Solving them, we can obtain the above formula.
For example, in an IPD game, let rx = 0.4 and ry > 0.6. Now we are in a
situation where there is lack of resources (as rx+ry > 1) and Player y is more proself
than Player x. As such, Player y will always defect, while Player x will sometimes
cooperate, and sometimes defect. In a steady state, Player x will get 10
11
and Player
y will get 15
11
at each game on average.
Theorem 5. If rx < 1− ry < 0.5, there are two cases:
• when rx < SS+T , Player x gets S while Player y gets T ;
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Proof. The proof for the first case is the same that of Theorem 3 above. The proof
of the second case is as follows. When gy < ry, Player x cooperates and gets S and
Player y defects and gets T . When gy ≥ ry, both players cooperate and get R. In
steady state, they will get (S, T ) or (R,R) in each game in a way that ry is achieved.
Let nCC be the portion of the games resulted in CC, Player x gets p̄x and Player y
gets p̄y where p̄y = ry(p̄x+p̄y), p̄x = RnCC+S(1−nCC) and p̄y = RnCC+T (1−nCC).
Solving them, we can obtain the above formula.
For example, in an IPD game, let rx < 0.4 and ry = 0.6. Then, as resources
are plentiful (as rx + ry < 1) and Player x is more prosocial than Player y, Player
x will always cooperate, while Player y will sometimes cooperate, and sometimes
defect. In a steady state, Player x will get 30
13





We have performed several experiments in order to investigate the emergence of
cooperative populations. These experiments involve evolutionary simulations on a
society of players and the simulations are designed based on social orientations of
individuals, as described below.
We used the replicator dynamics for evolutionary simulations [28]. We used the
well-known “infinite population” setup for initializing the population as described
in [18–20]. We randomly generated 10 theta values from the interval [0, π/2] and
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assumed the size of a group with a particular θ value constitutes 10% of the entire
population.
In each generation, the players engaged in pairwise encounters, resulting in
a payoff for each of the players that is equal to the sum of the payoffs from each
individual round of the game. The expected values of the score of a player in
a pairwise game in steady state are described in the previous section. After each
generation, each player had a number of offspring that is proportional to its expected
total payoff. Each offspring had the same social-orientation value θ as its parent. If
the frequency of a group of players with a particular θ value drops below a threshold
0.001 then the group is discarded from the population.
On average, in every 100 generations, a small amount (frequency of 0.01) of
new randomly generated mutant players are introduced into the population. Each
simulation was performed for 10,000 generations, resulting a total of about 100
mutant strategies.
3.5.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma with Constant Payoffs
Figure 3.5 shows the average population θ and average population payoff of an evo-
lutionary process of over 105 generations in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game.
Here, the average payoff varies between P and R, which correspond to full defection
and full cooperation, respectively. At the beginning of the evolutionary simulation,
cooperative players in the population which have high θ values dominate the popula-
tion quickly. Then, proself players (with low θ value) emerge gradually to dominate
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Figure 3.5: An evolutionary simulation of IPD. The top graph shows the average
theta per generation. The bottom graph shows the average payoff per generation.
after about 4000 generations. At around the 10000th generation, cooperative players
suddenly regain the majority of the population. This wave-like behavior between
cooperation and defection (prey-predator cycle), is a widely known phenomenon in
repeated PD games, that was observed under various conditions [19,20]. As can be
seen in Figure 3.5, similar behavior also emerges in our experiments with players
modeled by their social orientation values.
By examining the evolutionary traces, we found that this phenomenon is
caused by mutant players introduced in the population with θmutant ≈ π/4. These
fair players avoided the exploitation of proself players with θproself < π/4, and at
the same time cooperated with the other prosocial players with θprosocial > π/4. In
other words, the mutant players were using strategies similar to Tit-For-Tat.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the change of population frequencies of three types of
players (selfish, altruistic, and fair) without mutation. At the beginning, altruistic
players dominate the population. The theta value of an altruistic player is π/2; i.e.,
it will always cooperate. Therefore, it can be easily exploited and invaded by selfish
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Figure 3.6: Invasion of fair player.
players (θ = 0). When the altruistic players are extinct, selfish players can also
be invaded by a group of fair players who will cooperate among themselves. This
evolutionary pattern is similar to the one that emerges in the classical rational agent
model [33].
Our results shown in Figure 3.5 also suggested that after the fair player beats
the selfish player, the population enters a random drift period. Due to the random
mutation, the average theta of the population increases slowly to a point at which
there are many highly-cooperative players. Then, mutations introduce selfish players
into the populations and their numbers grow quickly until they dominate the entire
population. This pattern repeats at least until 107 generations. This ratifies previous
findings on evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection [34], which shows that
our model based social orientations is capable of explaining those findings.
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3.5.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma with Varying payoffs
We also investigated the effects that different matrix values have on the result of the
evolutionary process and the resulting cooperative societies. In these experiments,
we varied one of the entries in the PD game matrix while keeping the others constant
with their original values as well as keeping the preference relations in the PD matrix,
i.e., S < P < R < T and 2R > S + T , so that the game will still be a PD game.
For each matrix generated in this way, we ran 20 evolutionary simulations with 105
generations in each run with a total of about 1000 mutant strategies.
Figure 3.7 shows the effect of varying R on the average theta and average
payoff of the population. We report the average of the data after 1000 generations
because often the majority of the groups of players did not emerge before that.
Increasing R provides added incentive to cooperate. Therefore, both the theta and
average payoff increase with R. Note that the payoff almost reaches the maximum
(i.e., R) after R = 4.7, i.e., it becomes always full cooperation when R is large
enough. The bottom graph shows the effect of R on the percentage of cooperative
agents which is defined by the portion of agents whose θ is greater than the π/4
(i.e., the θ of a fair player).
Figure 3.8 shows the effect of T on the average payoff and the cooperativeness
of the population. These results suggest that increasing T will lead to increase in
the incentive to defect. In any situation that can be modeled by a 2x2 game similar
to Prisoners’ Dilemma, which shows that there is a degradation in the cooperation
level. Therefore, both θ and payoff decrease when T increases.
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Figure 3.9 shows the effect of P on the average payoff and the cooperativeness
of the population. In general, the average payoff increases when P increases. How-
ever, unlike the case for R or T , the average of θ drops sharply when P is very large
compared to R. These results suggest that increasing P will lead to an increase in
the average payoff, but not increase the cooperativeness of the population. In other
words, using our model we are able to notice that there is no one-to-one correlation
between the observed average payoff and the society’s cooperativeness level. In this
case, using previously suggested models one could mistakenly reason that increasing
P and R has the same effect on the society, while with our new model the difference
in the true cooperativeness of the society is apparent by looking at the theta values
of its individuals.
3.6 Summary
We have described a formal model that combines game-theoretical analyses for co-
operation in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with insights from social and behavioral
sciences. Our model is not claimed to be the most accurate account of social orien-
tations; rather, it is a simple model that takes the first step in the above direction.
Unlike existing models, this formalism captures the notion of prosocial vs. pro-
self orientations exhibited in human behavior and explicitly provides an abstract
representation for how a player develops its strategies in repeated games.
We have presented theorems showing how players with different social tenden-
cies interact. Our theorems identify five general steady-state behavioral patterns,
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that can be explained in terms of the players’ social orientation values. We have also
performed an experimental evaluation of our model using evolutionary simulations
in the well-known IPD game. The results of the experiments demonstrated that our
model captures the well-known behavior patterns in IPD. Furthermore, it allows
modeling richer behavior patterns since it does not depend on the particular game
matrix.
When we varied the payoffs in the game matrix while keeping the preference re-
lations intact in the PD game, one set of experiments showed that prosocial tendency
increases when the reward (i.e., R) of the game increases or when the temptation
(i.e., T ) decreases. Another set of experiments identified a class of scenarios in
which the evolution simulations produced a population that is not socially-oriented
toward cooperation, whereas the average payoff of the population is still high. This
result is contrary to the implicit assumption of all previous works that considered
cooperative populations, that the high-payoff was assumed to be an indicator for co-
operativeness. Our experiment showed that social orientations in a population could
be a more realistic representation of the cooperativeness of the entire population.
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Figure 3.7: Top graph: effect of R on average payoff. Middle graph: effect of R on
average theta. Bottom graph: effect of R on the percentage of cooperative agents.
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Figure 3.8: Top graph: effect of T on average payoff. Middle graph: effect of T on
average theta. Bottom graph: effect of T on the percentage of cooperative agents.
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Figure 3.9: Top graph: effect of P on average payoff. Middle graph: effect of P on
average theta. Bottom graph: effect of P on the percentage of cooperative agents.
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Chapter 4: Strategies Using SVO model for The Life Game
Standard repeated-game model involve repetitions of a single stage game (e.g., the
Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Stag Hunt); but it is clear that repeatedly playing the
same stage game is not an accurate model of most individuals’ lives. Rather, indi-
viduals’ interactions with others correspond to many different kinds of stage games.
In this chapter, we concentrate on discovering behavioral strategies that are
successful for the life game, in which the stage game is chosen stochastically at each
iteration. We present an agent model based on Social Value Orientation (SVO)
theory. We provide extensive evaluations of our model’s performance, both against
standard agents from the game theory literature and against a large set of life-game
agents written by students in two different countries. Our empirical results suggest
that for life-game strategies to be successful in environments with such agents, it
is important (i) to be unforgiving with respect to trust behavior and (ii) to use
adaptive, fine-grained opponent models of the other agents.
4.1 Introduction
In the standard repeated-game model, a set of agents repeatedly play a game called
the stage game. Many different games can be used as the stage game. For example,
36
Axelrod’s famous Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma competitions showed the emergence
of cooperation, even though the rational dominant equilibrium in a one-shot Pris-
oner’s Dilemma is to defect [12]. Maynard Smith studied two-player Chicken game
with a population of Hawks and Doves [13], and Skyrms studied the evolved popu-
lation when individuals were playing the Stag-hunt game [14].
Each of the above studies used a simple game model in which the same stage
game was used at every iteration. However, as discussed in Section 2.2 repeatedly
playing the same game is unlikely to be an accurate model of any individual’s life.
As a more accurate model, Bacharach proposed the Life Game, in which an individ-
ual plays a mixture of games drawn sequentially according to some stochastic process
from many stage games. We formally described the Life Game in Section 2.2. In
this chapter, we concentrate on discovering behavioral strategies that are successful
in life games. These games pose difficulties when trying to describe a successful
strategy. For example, well-known strategies such as the famous tit-for-tat strat-
egy cannot be used verbatim, because not all iterations will have actions in which
the actions correspond to “Cooperate” and “Defect.” The complexity of the game
dictates a large, complex strategy space, but our objective is to discover important
general properties that characterize successful strategies.
The most relevant piece of literature to our study is a recent paper [35] where
the authors presented an equilibrium analysis for the emergent of cultures when
playing multiple games. Nevertheless, they were not concerned with the success
of individual strategies, and assumed a predefined set of 6 games with explicitly
labeled actions to avoid the semantic problem.
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This chapter makes the following contributions. We propose a behavioral
model for agents in the life game, based upon a prominent social-preference the-
ory called Social Value Orientation theory (SVO). We also refine and extensively
evaluate our model using a large set of peer-designed agents written by students in
two different countries. Our empirical results suggest that an unforgiving strategy
performs better than a tit-for-tat-like strategy. That is, in stage games where there
are analogs of “Cooperate” and “Defect” (as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma), if another
agent chooses the “Defect” action rather than the “Cooperate” action, then we
should expect them to behave similarly in future iterations, and choose our actions
accordingly. The empirical work also demonstrates the importance of an adaptive,
fine-grained set of opponent models in successful strategies.
4.2 Strategies for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
There have been many studies on iterated games in the game theory literature. The
most famous example is the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) (see Figure 3.1),
which is an iterated variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma that is played repeatedly
an unknown number of iterations. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a widely used model
for social dilemmas between two agents and has been often used to study theories
of human cooperation and trust. The intriguing characteristic of the IPD is that
while game theory analysis for a single iteration suggests that rational agents should
“Defect”, cooperation often emerges when the number of iterations is unknown.
One of the first interesting questions with respect to the IPD was the discovery
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and description of successful IPD strategies. These strategies and their properties
were meant to help enrich the theoretical biology/evolutionary discussion on various
mechanisms that complement the Darwinian process (for instance: reciprocity, kin
selection, group selection). An important milestone was the completion of two
publicly open IPD tournaments that were run by Robert Axelrod in the early 80s
[12]. In his tournament, each strategy was paired with each other strategy for
200 iterations of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, and scored on the total payoffs accumulated
through the tournament. The winner of the first tournament was Anatol Rapoport’s
tit-for-tat strategy, which simply cooperates on the first iteration of the game, and
then repeats the other agent’s action from the previous iteration. Surprisingly, the
same tit-for-tat strategy was also the winner in the second tournament.
Axelrod, in his post tournaments analysis, discovered that greedy strategies
tended to do very poorly in the long run while cooperative strategies did better.
Furthermore, by analyzing the top-scoring strategies in the tournament, Axelrod
presented several properties that describe successful strategies: nice (cooperate,
never be the first to defect), provocable to both retaliation and forgiveness (return
defection for defection, cooperation for cooperation), non-envious (be fair with your
partner), and clarity (don’t try to be tricky). Since Axelrod’s IPD tournaments,
there has been an extensive research on finding and describing successful strategies
[22,36].
As our main focus of this chapter is the life game, in which a different stage
game can be played at each iteration, there is one crucial assumption behind the
above strategies: they assume that the semantic of the actions is a common knowl-
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edge to all agents. For example, in order to reciprocate or retaliate, a tit-for-tat
agent needs to know the semantic of the previous action of the other agent from
the perspective of the other agent. This assumption is valid for IPD, because the
semantic (Cooperate and Defect) is clearly defined for all agents. However, in the
life game, which is the main focus of this chapter, this assumption is no longer valid.
As we will see below (in Section 4.3), most known strategies simply cannot be gen-
eralized to the complex world of the life game, and consequently, new ones must be
defined.
4.3 Strategies for the Life Game
The IPD competition was an important cornerstone for studying the evolution of
cooperation and led to some interesting game strategies. However, extending the
model to the life game, which is a more realistic description of the interactions in
a society, raises the following difficulties. First, from the semantic point of view,
unlike the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which actions are labeled by “Cooperate” or “De-
fect”, in the life game the actions are not labeled in advance. The agents will need
to define themselves the semantic of each of the actions in each round of the game.
Consequently, the intentions behind the actions might be misinterpreted due to se-
mantic differences, which also complicates the playing strategies. For example, what
might look like a “Cooperate” action for one agent, might be interpreted differently
by another. Secondly, the semantic problems might also result in ambiguity with
respect to the intentions behind the actions, as the agent cannot be sure whether
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an action is a result of an intentional strategic decision, or due to semantic differ-
ences. As such, successful strategies might require holding some form of opponent





A1=Stag (2, 2) (0, 1)
Player 1
A2=Hare (1, 0) (1, 1)
Figure 4.1: The Stag Hunt game models two individuals go out on a hunt. If an
individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to
succeed. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a
stag.
To illustrate the problem, consider two tit-for-tat-like agents (x and y) playing
in a repeated game of Stag Hunt (Figure 4.1). Suppose both of them want to
cooperate (hunt stag together) in the Stag Hunt game, but x does not want to
cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (while y still want to cooperate). If x and
y play in repeated sequence of only Stag Hunt games, they will cooperate with
each other forever. However, the cooperation in Stag Hunt may not emerge if we
have a mix of Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt games. For example, if the first
game is Prisoner’s Dilemma and the second game is Stag Hunt, when x defects
y in the first game, y retaliates by “defecting” in the Stag Hunt game (i.e., hunt
Hare). Therefore, x will also retaliate in the next game that may lead to a chain of
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unnecessary retaliation.
The aforementioned difficulties as well as others bring about the need for
strategies that are far more complex than the ones that came out of research on the
traditional IPD. Intuitively, simple strategies such as tit-for-tat cannot be directly
applied to the life game due to the labeling problem mentioned above. Our first
step in developing a strategy was to look in the social and behavioral sciences lit-
erature and examine the behavioral theories that guide human behaviors in similar
situations.
4.4 Social Value Orientation Agent Models
According to the SVO theory (described in Section 2.1), the choices people make
depend, among other things, on stable personality differences in the manner in
which they approach interdependent others. SVO regards social values as distinct
sets of motivational or strategic preferences with the weighting rule depending on
the weights w1 and w2 of agents’ payoffs:
Utility = w1 ×my payoff + w2 × other’s payoff
• Altruistic agent maximizes other agent’s outcome.
(w1 = 0, w2 = 1)
• Cooperative agent maximizes joint outcome.
(w1 = 1, w2 = 1)
• Individualistic agent maximizes its own outcome.
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(w1 = 1, w2 = 0)
• Competitive agent maximizes its own outcome relative to other.
(w1 = 1, w2 = −1)
• Adverse agent minimizes other agent’s outcome.
(w1 = 0, w2 = −1)
In order to promote cooperation, both agents need to be prosocial. As men-
tioned in [29], “An excellent way to promote cooperation in a society is to teach
people to care about the welfare of others”. However, due to possible differences
in the semantic of the games, both agents should have some way to assess mutual
trust in order to deal with cases in which the different semantic interpretation were
the cause of cooperation breakdown (as oppose to intentional breakdown). In other
words, both agents need to believe that the other agent is prosocial. From the
social and behavioral literature we learn that social value orientations significantly
accounts for variation in trust and reciprocity. Specifically, prosocial individuals
reciprocate more as the trust increases, while proself reciprocate less as the trust
increases [37]. People with a natural inclination to cooperate are at the same time
vulnerable to being exploited.
The agent model that will be developed in our suggested agent will be based
on the above insights from the social and behavioral sciences. The following sections
describe the agent model for the three most common social orientations in real world:
cooperative, individualistic, and competitive.
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4.4.1 Cooperative Model
A cooperative agent is one whose goal is to maximize (to some degree) the joint
outcome of both agents. In the context of 2x2 symmetric games, a fully cooperative
agent will choose A1 if a > d and A2 if a < d. In IPD, the ALL C strategy, which
always cooperates with others, can be regarded as a fully cooperative strategy. To
account for the varying degrees of prosocial tendencies and cope with the aforemen-
tioned semantic problem, we need to be able to differentiate between different types
of cooperative behavior. To do so we define the class of mutual-benefit games:
Definition 1 (Mutual-Benefit game). a mutual-benefit game is a 2x2 symmetric
game in which there exist an unique action Ai such that the joint outcome is maxi-
mized when both agent choose Ai. Action Ai will be denoted as a cooperative action.
The varying degrees of prosocial tendencies suggest that different agents may
want to restrict their cooperation to specific classes of mutual-benefit games. In
general, agents with higher prosocial orientations will tend to cooperate on a larger
subset of mutual-benefit games, as long as they believe that the other agent is also
cooperative. We now present a possible classification to mutual-benefit games:1
1. a 6= d and max(a, d) > max(b, c)
2. a 6= d and max(a, d) ≥ max(b, c)
1Note that the presented classification is one possible example of coping with the semantic prob-
lem. Naturally, a finer classification might allow the agent to distinguish between finer behavioral
differences.
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3. a 6= d and max(a, d)× 2 > b+ c
4. a 6= d and max(a, d)× 2 ≥ b+ c
In this classification, type τ is a subset of type τ + 1. For example, the Stag
Hunt game (Figure 4.1) is a member of all of the above types, while the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (Figure 3.1) is a member of types 3 and 4 only.
In many types of symmetric games cooperation is beneficial for both agents
in the long run. However, there are two major problems. First, a cooperative agent
may subject to exploitation by the other agents. Second, the trustworthiness of the
other agent is unknown at the beginning. Those problems will be addressed in the
following trust mechanism.
We define the trustworthiness of an agent as follow: The trustworthiness of an
agent is λ if and only if the agent cooperates in all mutual-benefit games of type τ .
It is easy to notice that it is riskier to cooperate in type τ + 1 games than in type τ
games. Accordingly, the type number of a mutual-benefit game can be considered
as the trustworthiness requirement of the game in order to cooperate with the other
agent. An agent will need higher trust levels to cooperate in type τ +1 games, while
trustworthiness of zero reflects an agent that does not cooperate at all.
Recall that according to Axelrod’s analysis of the IPD competition, a “nice”
strategy helps to promote cooperation. Accordingly, our trust model will assume
that the other agent is trustworthy at the beginning, and will remain so as long
as it cooperates in all mutual-benefit games. Specifically, with the mutual benefit
games classification presented above, we initialize the trustworthiness level of the
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other agent to 4.
To minimize exploitation, the trustworthiness of the other agent should be
decreased whenever a defect-like action is observed. Suppose the current trustwor-
thiness of the other agent is λ. Whenever the other agent defects in a mutual-
benefit game of type τ , we update λ by λ = min(λ, τ − 1). For example, if the
trustworthiness of an agent is updated to 3, then our agent will cooperate only in
mutual-benefit games from type 1 to 3, but not type 4. This allows the agent to
maximize the amount of cooperation, while minimizing exploitation.
When an untrusted agent (with low trustworthiness) try to establish coopera-
tion in some mutual-benefit games, one may forgive it (increase its trustworthiness)
or not forgive it (trustworthiness remains unchanged). We parameterize these be-
haviors by a forgiving threshold, f : The trustworthiness of an agent can be restored
back to λ when f cooperative actions in a game of type λ were observed. In IPD,
a SVO agent with f = 1 will behave like tit-for-tat. If f = ∞, an untrusted agent
can never be trusted again. In other words, the trustworthiness of other agent is
monotonically decreasing. This replicates the grim trigger strategy in IPD, which
upon defection responds with defection for the remainder of the iterated game.
4.4.2 Individualistic Model
According to the SVO theory, an individualistic agent will try to maximize its own
outcome. However, the information that an agent x is a self maximizing agent is
insufficient to model and predict its behavior, as its behavior will depend on its
46
belief about the strategy of the other agent y. For instance, its actions might be
different if it assumes y picks its actions randomly, or tries to intentionally decrease
x’s payoff.
To cope with this problem, we suggest using two-level agent modeling. In this
model, when an individualistic agent x is playing with another agent y, x behavior
depends on the second-level model – model of y from x’s perspective. With that
assumption, x can construct a best response strategy.
These behavior models will be input to the algorithm beforehand and will
depend on the underlying game. We hypothesize that a larger and more diverge
set of predefined models, will allow the SVO agent to better adapt its behavior
(this will be explicitly tested in Section 4.5). For the life game, we can suggest
the following types of second-level model which represents the simplest forms of
opponent reasoning in this domain: adversary, altruistic, random, and recursive.




A1=Swerve (4, 4) (3, 5)
Player 1
A2=Straight (5, 3) (0, 0)
Figure 4.2: The Chicken game models two drivers, both headed for a single lane
bridge from opposite directions. The first to swerve away yields the bridge to the
other. If neither agent swerves, the result is a potentially fatal head-on collision.
We illustrate it by following example: an individualistic agent x is playing the
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Chicken game (Figure 4.2) with y.
• Adversary model - x assumes that y wants to minimize its outcome. Then,
it reasons that (1) y will choose A2 if x chooses A1; (2) y will still choose A2 if
x chooses A2. The payoffs are (3, 5) and (0, 0) respectively, and x will choose
A1. In other words, x best response is to be playing a maximin strategy.
• Altruistic model - x assumes that y is wants to maximize x’s outcome. Then,
it reasons that (1) y will choose A1 if x chooses A1; (2) y will still choose A1 if
x chooses A2. The payoffs are (4, 4) and (5, 3) respectively, and x will choose
A2. In this case x’s best response strategy is the maximax strategy.
• Random model - x assumes y is purely random with 50% chance for both
A1 and A2. This can happen, for example, in cases where it does not have
enough information. The expected payoff of choosing A1 is
a+b
2









, and choose A2
otherwise. Therefore, x will choose A1 in the Chicken game. We will call x is
playing a maxi-random strategy.
• Recursive model - Finally, x can assume that y is any kind of agent described
above. x will first predict y action using that assumption, and then choose
an action to maximize its own payoff. In other words, in terms of traditional
game theory, given a game, x’s strategy is the best response to the assumed
y’s strategy. For example, x can assume that y is an individualistic agent with
random opponent assumption (i.e., y uses the maxi-random strategy). From
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the previous paragraph, we know that y will choose A1 in the Chicken game.
Therefore, x will also choose A1 in order to maximize its own payoff. We will
call x is playing a maxi-maxi-random strategy.
4.4.3 Competitive Model
According to the SVO theory, a competitive agent will try to maximize (to some
degree) its own outcome with respect to the other agent. In the context of 2x2
symmetric games, this amounts to maximizing the payoff differences of both agents,
and will choose A1 if b > c and A2 if b < c.
When we sum up the total payoffs for each agent in a tournament of a group
of agents, a competitive strategy is not necessary the best one. For example, in
the IPD competition, a competitive agent acts like a ALL D agent which always
defects. If there are only two agents, ALL D always perform at least as good as
the other agent. However, ALL D performs poorly in a group of tit-for-tat agents,
because the group of tit-for-tat agent will cooperate with each other and obtains a
huge amount of payoff from the cooperation [29].
4.4.4 The Combined SVO Agent Modeling Strategy
Based on the SVO agent models present above, we propose a SVO agent modeling
strategy for playing with other agent in the life game. The complete procedure for
our SVO agent is shown in Figure 4.3. Since we assume that all agents does not




gt, gt−1 = current, and previous game matrix
A = previous opponent’s action
M = current set of candidate opponent models
λ = current trustworthiness of the opponent
τ(g) = trustworthiness requirement of g
C(g) = cooperative action of g if g is a mutual-benefit game, ∅ otherwise
Output: An action for the current game gt
Begin procedure
(1) Update opponent’s trustworthiness and models (when A 6= ∅ and gt−1 6= ∅).
If C(gt−1) 6= ∅ and λ ≥ τ(gt−1) and A 6= C(gt−1), then λ← τ(gt−1)− 1
Increase the counters of all models (in M) which correctly predict A for gt−1.
(2) Choose and return an action for the current game gt.
If C(gt) 6= ∅ and λ ≥ τ(gt), then return C(gt).
Else
m← the most accurate model in M
If i ≤ 5 or accuracy of m < 70%, then return maxi-random action of gt.
Else return the best response to m’s prediction in the game gt.
End procedure
Figure 4.3: Procedure for a (unforgiving) SVO agent playing a game gt at t-th
iteration in a life game.
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social orientation of the other agent. The agent will start with some default models,
and will estimate the orientation of other agent from the history of interactions.
As we mentioned before, the agent starts by assuming that the other agent is
cooperative for all types of mutual-benefit games. For non-mutual-benefit games,
the cooperative agent model is not applicable. For those games, the SVO agent
initially assumes the other agent is random (i.e., no social orientation at all) and
will use the maxi-random strategy for the first few games. After accumulating
some interaction histories, the agent will learn the true trustworthiness (i.e., λ in
Figure 4.3) and social orientation of the other agent, and will adapt and utilize it
to the best of its capacity.
Similarly to humans, as long as there is some degree of cooperation, our agent
will cooperate with others as much as they cooperate with it. However, when the
trust model suggests that the other agent is not cooperative in some mutual-benefit
games or the game itself is a non-mutual-benefit game, one should refer to a dif-
ferent state of mind to achieve its goal while avoiding exploitation. To better
estimate whether the other agent is an individualistic agent (under the different
predefined models), or a competitive one, we incorporated opponent modeling tech-
niques. Specifically, the SVO agent will use a model-and-counter strategy, which
first approximates what strategy the other agent uses and then counters that strat-
egy. First, it creates and maintains a pool of possible individualistic or competitive
models (i.e., M in Figure 4.3). In this chapter, we consider the following five non-
cooperative opponent models described before:
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1. Competitive
2. Individualistic with maximin assumption
3. Individualistic with maximax assumption
4. Individualistic with maxi-random assumption
5. Individualistic with maxi-maxi-random assumption
Each model has a counter variable for counting the number of correct predic-
tions. If the previous action of the other agent matches the prediction of one of the
model, our agent will increase the counter of that model by one. The model with
the highest counter is considered as the most accurate model (i.e., m in Figure 4.3).
However, if the top counter is small (e.g., less than 70% of the total) when com-
pared with the total number of counted game, our agent will assume the opponent
is a random agent instead of the model with the highest count, and will use the
maxi-random strategy. After knowing the most accurate model of our opponent,
our agent will try to counter that strategy by maximizing its own payoff using that
opponent model, i.e., it first predicts opponent’s action using the opponent model,
and then it chooses an action which maximizes its own payoff assuming that the
other agent will choose the predicted action (i.e., A in Figure 4.3).
4.5 Experiments and Results
In this section our goal is to evaluate the performance of our SVO agent and investi-
gate the properties of successful strategies in the life game. As such, we implemented
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an automated SVO based agent and in order to evaluate its performance we imple-
mented the following agents that represent well-known strategies in the game theory
literature:
1. Nash agent – chooses pure Nash equilibrium strategy if it’s unique; else plays
mixed Nash equilibrium strategy.
2. Maximin agent – maximizes its min. possible payoff.
3. Minimax agent – minimizes other agent’s max. payoff.
4. Minimax-regret agent – minimizes its worst-case regret (difference between
actual payoff and the payoff had a different action been chosen).
5. Random agent – probability 1/2 of either action.
To the best of our knowledge, the above standard strategies represent the best
available strategies from the literature of repeated games, which are applicable to
the life game. As discussed earlier, other strategies such as the successful tit-for-tat
cannot be generalized and used in the life game.
Due to the novelty of the life game, and in order to provide a richer set of
strategies to evaluate the SVO agent, we collected a large set of students’ agents /
Peer Designed Agents (PDAs). PDAs have been recently used with great success in
AI to evolve and evaluate state-of-the-art agents for various tasks such as negotiation
and collaboration [23–25]. Lin et al. provided an empirical proof that PDAs can
alleviate the evaluation process of automatic negotiators, and facilitate their designs
[23].
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To obtain a large collection of students’ agents, we asked students in several
advanced-level AI and Game theory classes to contribute agents. To attain a richer
set of agents, we used two different universities in two different countries: University
of Maryland in the USA, and Bar-Ilan University in Israel. The students were told
that their agent would compete against all the agents of the other students in the
class (once against each agent in a round-robin fashion). The instructions stated
that at each iteration, they will be given a symmetric game with a random payoff
matrix of the form shown in Figure 2.1. Following Axelrod’s methodology, we did
not tell the students the exact number of iterations in each life game. The total
agent’s payoff will be the accumulated sum of payoffs with each of the other agents.
For motivational purposes, the project grade was positively correlated with their
agents overall ranking based on their total payoffs in the competition. Overall, we
collected 48 agents (24 from the USA and 24 from Israel).
4.5.1 Evaluating the SVO agent
The first experiment was meant to assess the competence of the suggested SVO based
agent. The version that was used in this experiment was with f = ∞ (unforgiving
trust method), in which following a (perceived) defection and a consequent lost of
trust level, it cannot be recovered.
We ran tournaments with the unforgiving SVO agent and all the other agents
in the test set. Since the test set is composed of 53 agents (48 students’ agents + 5
standard strategies), the total number of participant in each run of the competition
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Table 4.1: Average payoffs and rankings of the SVO agent, standard agents and top
three students’ agents
Agent Rank and (Avg Payoff)
SVO agent 1 (5.836)
The best students’ agent 2 (5.831)
The 2nd best students’ agent 3 (5.792)
The 3rd best students’ agent 4 (5.789)
Minimax regret agent 6 (5.695)
Maximin agent 35 (5.453)
Nash agent 43 (5.271)
Random agent 52 (4.351)
Minimax agent 54 (3.954)
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is m = 54. The tournament is similar to Axelrod’s IPD tournaments [12] and
the 2005 IPD tournament [38]. Each participant played against every participant
including itself (thus a tournament among m agents consists of m2 iterated games).
The number of iterations in one life game was set to n = 200. In each experiment,
we calculated the average payoff per game for each agent. Since the values in the
payoff matrix are chosen uniformly from [0, 9], the expected average payoff of a
random agent who played with another random agent is 4.5. In order to have a fair
comparison, we used the same sequence of random games for each of the pairs in the
experiment. We repeated the experiment 100 times using different random seeds,
so each average payoff is an average of 100× n×m payoffs, where n is the number
of iterations in each life game and m is the number of participating agents. Hence,
each average payoff is computed from averaging the payoffs of 1080000 games.
Table 4.1 shows average payoffs and rankings of the SVO agent, standard
agents and the top three students’ agents. The SVO agent has the highest average
payoff (significant at p < 0.05), and so it ranked number one. Because the standard
agents are not adaptive, and cannot learn from the history of interactions, their
performances are bad in general, except the minimax regret agent. The minimax
regret agent performed well in the tournament, unexpectedly. One possible reason
is that it does not have any assumption on its opponent, and focus on minimizing
its own possible regret.
The performances of the top students’ agents are very close to our SVO agent.
In our post-experiment analysis, we found that most of them are doing some sort
of opponent modeling by counting (i.e., similar to our counting method), but none
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Table 4.2: Evaluating trust adaptation – Results
Agent Rank and (Avg Payoff)
in Each Tournament
Unforgiving SVO agent (f =∞) 1 (5.836)
Forgiving SVO agent (f = 1) 6 (5.689)
Forgiving SVO agent (f = 2) 5 (5.722)
Forgiving SVO agent (f = 3) 5 (5.744)
Forgiving SVO agent (f = 4) 5 (5.757)
of them are modeling the other agent using trust or SVO. Moreover, in contrast to
the SVO algorithm which is relatively short and simple, their algorithms are much
longer and complicated.
4.5.2 Evaluating Trust Adaptation: to forgive or not forgive?
As mentioned in Section 4.4.1, our agent trust adaptation approach can be set using
the f parameter. We would like to study if a forgiving approach is a better-suited
approach in repeated stochastic 2x2 symmetric games. As such, we varied the f
parameter from the unforgiving approach (f = ∞) to SVO agents with different
forgiveness thresholds, and ran four additional tournaments for each forgiving SVO
agent (f = 1, 2, 3, 4). The methodology to evaluate an agent P was to run a tourna-
ment with P and all the other agents in the test set. In other words, for each SVO
agent P , we reran the previous tournament with the original SVO agent replaced
by P .
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Table 4.3: Evaluating the Individualistic Opponent Models – Results
Agent Rank and (Avg Payoff)
in Each Tournament
SVO agent 1 (5.836)
Maxi-maxi-rand-only agent 2 (5.800)
Maxi-rand-only agent 5 (5.721)
Maximin-only agent 5 (5.700)
Maximax-only agent 9 (5.681)
As we can see in Table 4.2, the average payoffs of all of the forgiving agents
are lower than that of the unforgiving agent (significant at p < 0.05). This result is
interesting as it may contradict to some extent the “forgiving” property of successful
strategies in IPD as described by Axelrod. On the other hand, there is a possible
confounding factor in our experiments. In particular, we have some preliminary
results suggesting that the students’ agents (against which we tested our agents)
behaved in ways that were correlated with some of the personality characteristics of
the students who wrote those agents. As those students were primarily young males,
it is possible that the students’ agents constituted a biased sample. We observed
that if a student’s agent defects on another agent at the beginning of the life game,
it is very likely that it will defect again later. Therefore, the risk and cost of a
forgiving approach is high, which probably explains the decrease in performance.
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4.5.3 Evaluating the Individualistic Opponent Models
One of our hypotheses during the model’s construction was that a larger set of op-
ponent models would provide a more refined playground to differentiate and classify
different models, which in turn will allow the agent to provide better responses to
their strategies. To investigate the significance of each component of individualis-
tic model, we implemented four simplified versions of the SVO agent, where each
contained a single, predefined opponent model:
1. Maximin-only agent – uses the maximin model for individualistic agent mod-
eling.
2. Maximax-only agent – uses the maximax model for individualistic agent mod-
eling.
3. Maxi-rand-only agent – uses the maxi-random model for individualistic agent
modeling.
4. Maxi-maxi-rand-only agent – uses the maxi-maxi-random model for individu-
alistic agent modeling.
We tested the above four agents by running four additional tournaments for
each of them. Table 4.3 shows the average payoffs and rankings of the four agents
in each of the tournament, as well as the complete SVO agent. We can see that the
average payoffs of all of the four simplified agents are less than that of the complete
SVO agent (significant at p < 0.05). These results ratify our hypothesis that a
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single individualistic opponent model is not refined enough for successful opponent
modeling.
4.5.4 Evaluating Robustness to Number of Iterations
Figure 4.4: Average payoffs at each iteration (smoothed by moving window average).
To investigate the performance of the SVO agent at different number of it-
erations, we recorded the average payoffs the agent obtained at different iteration
in the tournament. Figure 4.4 shows the trends of the average payoffs of the SVO
agent, the best students’ agent and the best standard agent (i.e., the minimax regret
agent). With an increasing number of iterations, both SVO agent and the best stu-
60
dents’ agent obtained higher payoffs and level off after about 60th iteration, while
the payoff of the minimax regret agent remains the same most of the time. The
increase is probably due to the fact that both SVO agent and the best students’
agent are doing opponent modeling. With an increase in the number of interactions,
the modeling will be more accurate, and so they can better coordinate with their
opponents to get higher payoffs. On the contrary, the minimax regret agent does
not change its strategy, so its performance remains unchanged most of the time.
The payoff of the SVO agent is low at the beginning of the life games, because it
begins by applying the “nice” strategy towards all other agents. If the other agent
is non-cooperative, the SVO agent may be exploited for the first few mutual-benefit
games, and lose some payoffs at the beginning. However, its performance catches
up quickly and outperforms others after the 20th iteration, because it will stop co-
operating with the defectors and keep cooperating with the cooperators. The best
students’ agents do not have trust modeling and cannot fully cooperate with others,
so it cannot get the full benefit from mutual cooperation. Therefore, the SVO can
obtain higher payoff in long run, while the other agents cannot.
4.5.5 Analyzing the Trustworthiness of the students’ agents
With this analysis we seek to explore the trustworthiness of the students’ agents that
were written by students, and investigate the significance of each mutual-benefit
game type. We did as follows: each of the students’ agents played against our
SVO agent. While in game, at each iteration, the distribution of all five types of
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of trustworthiness of the students’ agents at each iteration.
cooperative agents was recorded. Figure 4.5 shows the portion of the five types of
cooperation classification at each iteration. At the beginning, as we mentioned in
Section 4.4.4, the SVO agent assumed that all the other agents are trustworthy, so
100% of them are of the type 4 (most trustworthy). However, the population of type
4 cooperation drops quickly as most of the agents start defecting in mutual-benefit
games. Therefore, the population of the others, less trustworthy agents, increases
quickly. The fastest population growth is of type 0 agents, which are not cooperative
at all. After 50th iteration, the distribution starts to stabilize. At the end, the whole
population consists of 74.8% type 0 agent, 13.8% type 1 agent, 7.3% type 2 agent,
62
0% type 3 agent, and 4.1% type 4 agent. This also shows that our classification of
cooperative agent is effective. For example, without that classification, we would
expect our agent to fail to cooperate with those 25.2% cooperative agents.
4.5.6 Evaluating the Benefit of Cooperation
Figure 4.6: Average payoffs at each iteration (smoothed by moving window average).
According to Axelrod’s analysis [12], cooperation is a crucial aspect of success-
ful strategies in the IPD tournament. While this hypothesis seems highly intuitive
and had many justifications from theoretical biology, in this experiment we went
examined this hypothesis explicitly.
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To study the amount of the benefit of cooperation, we implemented a paranoid
variant of the SVO agent, which do not trust other agent at any time. The paranoid
SVO agent assumes that all of the other agents are non-cooperative (type 0), so it
will not try to cooperate with other at all. In other words, we eliminated the “nice”
property of the SVO agent so it does not trust anyone at any time.
We test our original SVO agent, the paranoid SVO agent, and the best stu-
dents’ agent with the test set agents. The average payoffs of all three agents are
recorded at each iteration. Figures 4.6 shows the trends of their average payoffs.
With the increasing number of iterations, all agents obtained more payoffs in gen-
eral and level off after 60th iteration. It is because all of the three agents are doing
opponent modeling. When there is enough history of interaction, the modeling will
be more accurate, and so they can better coordinate with their opponent to get
more payoffs. The payoff of the original SVO agent is low at the beginning of the
repeated games, because it will try to be nice to all other agents at the beginning.
If the other agent is non-cooperative, the SVO agent may be exploited for the first
few mutual-benefit games, and lose some payoffs at the beginning. Its performance
catches up quickly and outperforms others after 20th iteration, because it will stop
cooperating with the defectors and keep cooperating with the cooperators. The
other two agents do not fully cooperate with others, so they cannot get the benefit
from mutual cooperation. Therefore, they cannot obtain higher payoff in long run.
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter we have described several new challenges posed by the life game
poses, for example, strategies that work well in conventional iterated games cannot
be used directly. In order to develop a successful strategy for the life game, we
utilized SVO theory, a motivational theory for human choice behavior. Our method
of agent modeling can be used to learn strategies and respond to others’ strategies
over time, to play the game well. Our experiments demonstrated that our SVO based
agent outperformed both standard repeated games strategies and a large set of peer-
designed agents. Furthermore, our experimental work illustrates the importance of
adaptive and fine-grained opponent modeling, as well as the impacts that different
trust adaptation strategies have on the performance of the SVO agent.
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Chapter 5: Modeling Agents using Designers’ Social Preference
According to the SVO theory (discussed in Section 2.1), there is evidence that in
interactions with others, humans have preferences that depend partly on a stable,
measurable personality trait called Social Value Orientation (SVO). Thus, if a hu-
man writes an agent to act as the human’s delegate in a multi-agent environment,
one might expect the agent’s behavior to be influenced by the human designer’s
SVO. In this chapter, we present experimental evidence that show that the social
preferences of computerized agents correlate positively with the social preferences of
their human designers. We also show that the human designers’ social preferences
can provide useful predictions of their agents’ behaviors.
5.1 Introduction
Human social preferences have been shown to play an important role in many areas
of decision-making; e.g., interaction in labor markets [39], bilateral or small-group
bargaining [40,41], social welfare considerations [42]. The social preferences depend
partly on a stable, measurable personality trait called a human’s Social Value Ori-
entation (SVO) (Section 2.1). In multi-agent systems, agents are often written by
humans to serve as their delegates when interacting with other agents. Thus, one
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might expect an agent’s behavior to be influenced by the SVO of its human de-
signer. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the correlation between the social
preferences of human designers and theirs computer agents.
There are many methods to gauge human social preferences or even person-
alities, as it is well studied in social psychology. Several measurement methods for
quantifying variations in SVO across individuals have been developed [6, 43,44]. In
addition to taking a psychology test that may be impractical in some situations,
personality of humans can also be estimated by social media, where users present
themselves to the world, revealing personal details and insights into their lives. For
example, Golbeck et al. [45,46] presented methods by which a user’s personality can
be accurately predicted through the publicly available information on their Face-
book or Twitter profile. Trust and distrust between users in social network can also
be accurately computed by an inference algorithm [47].
To obtain the social preferences of computer agents, we needed to have some
measurement methods. Quantifying the social preferences of computer agents presents
several challenges. The tests that were designed for humans cannot be easily con-
verted to automated agents. For instance, an agent that was constructed to play
in a simple repeated game cannot provide answers to questions out of the game
contexts, such as “what will you do in this situation?” More precisely, human SVO
is usually measured by one-shot games by giving the following instruction: “you
have been randomly paired with another person whom we refer to simply as other.
You will never knowingly meet or communicate with this other, nor will (s)he ever
knowingly meet or communicate with you.” In this chapter, we propose to use ideas
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and techniques derived from SVO theory to measure computer agents’ social pref-
erence. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to quantify the social
preference of computer agents using a theory from social psychology, and we will
explore the challenges and provide some ideas to address that challenge.
We collected a set of students’ agents playing life game and conducted psycho-
logical SVO based evaluation to get the corresponding SVO value of the human who
constructed the agent. We estimated the social preference of computer agents by the
proposed methods, and studied the correlation. The results show that the SVO of
human designer is highly correlated with the social preference of the corresponding
agent.
We also show the value of having the SVO of the designer of other agents by
presenting an application of using that information on agent modeling. Specifically,
we take the life game automated agent described in Chapter 4 and improve it by
using the knowledge of the SVO of the human delegator of the agent whom it is
playing against. The improvement mainly comes from a more accurate initial agent
model that can help the agent avoiding exploitation by some selfish agents.
To sum up, our main goal was to explore the correlation between the Social
Value Orientation of computer agents, and the human who designed them. As such
our main results can be summarized as follows:
• We explore, discuss, and provide a solution to the question of how SVO tests
that were designed for humans can be used to evaluate agents’ social prefer-
ences (Section 5.3).
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• We show that in our example domain (the life game) there is a high positive
correlation between the social preferences of agents and their human designers
(Section 5.4.1).
• We exemplify how the SVO information of the designer of computer agents
can be used to improve the performance of some other agents playing against
those agents (Section 5.5).
5.2 Measuring Human Social Preferences
There are many measurement methods proposed by social psychologist for measuring
human SVO [6,43,44,48]. To measure SVO of a person x, x is usually asked a series
of questions in which he needs to select between certain distributions of resources,
some amount to himself/herself, and some amount to be allocated to some other
randomly determined person y. The examiner will ask x to imagine that the points
involved with the decisions have value to you: specifically, the more of them you
accumulate the better. Similarly, x needs to imagine that the other person y feels
about his/her own points the same way. It is told that x and y will remain mutually
anonymous during and after the decision is made, and there is nothing y can do to
affect x in any way. In other words, it is an one-shot game. Hence the choice made
by x is not a strategic decision, but rather this is a one-shot individual decision
under certainty. Nonetheless this choice has a social dimension, as x’s action will
affect y’s behavior and x is aware of this potential effect.
For example, one well-known technique for measuring SVO used in social psy-
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Choose between:
A: pself,i(A) for me, and pother,i(A) for other
B: pself,i(B) for me, and pother,i(B) for other.
Figure 5.1: Format of i-th decision task of the ring measurement questionnaire
Choose between:
A: 26 for me, and 97 for other
B: 38 for me, and 92 for other.
Figure 5.2: A sample decision task used by the ring measurement questionnaire
chology is the Ring measure [43]. Typically, the ring measure involves a series of 24
decision tasks between two options. Figure 5.1 shows the format of each decision
task. The participants are told to be randomly paired with another person whom
the question refers to as “other.” In the decision task, the participants will be mak-
ing choices by circling the letter “A” or “B” on a response sheet. The participants’
choices will produce points/money for themselves and the other. The options involve
combinations of own outcome and other outcome. A sample decision task used by
the ring measurement questionnaire is shown in Figure 5.2.
Adding up the chosen amounts separately for the self and for the other player
provides an estimation of the weights assigned by the participant to own and other’s
payoffs. These weights are used to estimate the SVO angle (θ) of the participant by
the formula below:




), where ri = i-th response (5.1)
All angles between 112.5◦ and 67.5◦ were classified as altruistic; those between
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67.5◦ and 22.5◦ were classified as cooperative; those between 22.5◦ and 337.5◦ as
individualistic, and angles between 337.5◦ and 292.5◦ as competitive. 1 [43]
Since the total number of points a participant receives on each decision problem
is determined by the combination the choices of both participants, the participants
are in fact playing the following symmetric game for the i-th decision problem:
Player 2
A B
A pself,i(A) + pother,i(A) pself,i(A) + pother,i(B)
Player 1
B pself,i(B) + pother,i(A) pself,i(B) + pother,i(B)







There are several other techniques for measuring social preferences, such as the
decomposed game measure, the triple dominance measure, and the slider measure.
In a decomposed game, participants choose between three options that offer points
to the self and another person. The most commonly used measure of SVO is the




angles can be derived similarly.
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9-item triple-dominance measure. Typically, participants are classified as one of
three orientations (cooperators, individualists, or competitors) if they make 6 out of
9 choices consistent with the orientation. Like the ring measure, the slider measure
can help us estimate the SVO angles of participants; and it has been reported that
the slider measure has better test-retest reliability [49]; but as described in the next
section, Ring measure is the only one that can be adapted for use in a repeated-game
setting.
5.3 Measuring Agents’ Social Preferences
In order to model the behavior of an agent, we would like to have a precise quanti-
tative measurement (like SVO angle) on computer agents. For example, a Maximin
agent maximizes its worst-case payoff, so its SVO angle always equals to 0◦. A Min-
imax agent minimizes other agent’s best-case payoff, so its SVO angle always equals
to −90◦. Except for Ring method, all the other measurement methods cannot be
transformed into 2x2 games, so they cannot be used to measure social preferences of
computer agents playing 2x2 games (e.g., life game). Therefore, we use a modified
version of Ring method to measure social preference of agents.
Although the choice questions in Ring measurement can be presented as 2x2
normal form games, most of the payoff values of the game matrices are not valid
for the life game model we used. In the life game model we used, the payoff values
must be in the range [0, 9]. To apply Ring measurement on automated agents, we
modified the game matrices to GRing by downsampling, scaling, and translating, so
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that all payoff values will sit within [0, 9].
Another problem is that the agents were designed for repeated game. Even if
an agent has a fixed SVO in general, its actions toward a specific agent may depend
on its past experience of that agent. For example, an agent that is normally coop-
erative might behave aggressively toward another agent that behaved aggressively
toward it in the past. SVO measurements do not capture this influence on an agent’s
behaviors, because SVO measurements are always done on one-shot games against
an abstract and anonymous opponent. This non-repetitive interaction assumption
is not valid in most multi-agent environments. In the environment we used, the
repeated interaction is modeled by a repeated game with unknown number of iter-
ations.
In repeated games, an agent’s social preference can be influenced not only by
the agent’s own SVO, but also by how the agent reacts to the other agent’s SVO.
For example, let x be an agent whose SVO is 45◦ (i.e., it prefers equal payoffs for
both agents) and y be a memoryless agent whose SVO is 0◦ (i.e., y cares only about
maximizing its own payoff in the current iteration). If x and y interact repeatedly,
then after repeated observations of y’s behavior, x might decide that the best way
to equalize both agents’ cumulative payoffs might be for x to try to maximize its
own payoff at each iteration. Consequently, if we perform a Ring measurement of x
after it has had many interactions with y, x’s “apparent” SVO value may be closer
to 0◦ than 45◦. We will call this x’s para-SVO against y.
The para-SVO, θn(x|y), of agent x at the n-th iteration with tester agent
y is measured by applying the modified Ring measurement on the agent at the
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(n + 1)-th iteration after it interacted with the tester agent y for n iterations. In
this chapter, we use a random agent as the tester agent y. 2 The parameter n is
introduced, because we would like to measure social preference, which might change
during the interactions, at a specified iteration. Our measurement algorithm uses the
behavioral data of the agent at the last iteration, therefore the para-SVO represents
just the latest social preference of the agent after n games. Figure 5.3 shows the
complete procedure for measuring θn(x|y) using the modified game matrices GRing.
It will get the responses from the testee agent at the last game which is one of the
games in GRing, and then calculate the para-SVO using Formula (5.1). We verified
the validity of the measurement by applying it on some simple agents with known
para-SVO angles (e.g., para-SVO angles of maximin, minimax, and a prosocial agent
are 0◦, −90◦, and 45◦ respectively).
5.4 Experiments on Measuring Agents’ para-SVO
In this section, we will present some results on the relationship between social pref-
erences of agents and that of their designers. We collected a set of peer-designed
agents (PDAs) by asking students in several advanced-level AI and Game theory
classes to contribute agents. The students were told that their agent would compete
against all the agents of the other students in the class (once against each agent in
a round-robin fashion). We also asked the students to complete a questionnaire for
measuring their SVO [43,50].





n = number of random games (before measurement)
r = number of runs
GRing = set of games of modified Ring measurement
Output:
para-SVO of x with a tester agent y after n random games
Begin procedure
px ← 0 /* px = total payoff of agents using x’s strategy */
py ← 0 /* py = total payoff of agents using y’s strategy */
Repeat for r times:
For each game g in GRing:
create new agents x′ and y′ which use the same
strategies of x and y respectively
pair up x′ and y′ for a repeated game with n
random games and then g as the last game
px ← px + (last gain of x′ due to x′’s last action)








Figure 5.3: Procedure of measuring para-SVO of an agent x with a tester agent y
after n random games.
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Figure 5.4: SVO of 28 students.
We collected 28 agents with SVO of the corresponding designer. Figure 5.4
shows the SVO distribution of all 28 students. 21 of them are cooperative (67.5◦ >
SVO angle > 22.5◦ [43]), and 7 of them are individualistic (22.5◦ > SVO angle
> −22.5◦).3
5.4.1 Agent-human SVO Correlation
We used the modified ring method presented in Section 5.3 to measure the para-SVO
of all computer agents using different tester agents, and then calculated the Pearson
3It skews toward cooperative orientation, possibly because we collected the data from students
voluntarily responding to our survey.
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Figure 5.5: Correlation of human SVO and agents’ para-SVO.
correlation of the agents’ social preferences and human SVO. Figure 5.5 shows the
correlation of human SVO and agents’ para-SVO measured by the modified ring
method using different tester agents.
The x-axis of Figure 5.5 is the number of iterations (n) used for measuring
the agent SVO. The correlation at the first iteration is about 0.4, and then rises
to about 0.55, which is considered high in behavioral sciences [51], for several iter-
ations. After reading the source codes of the agents, we found that some students
wrote some codes for the first iteration only. In other words, they hard coded some
initial behaviors that may be different from other iterations. Figure 5.5 shows that
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the correlation between agents’ para-SVO and human SVO rises to a peak at sec-
ond iteration, and then decreases and level off for the rest of the repeated game.
From examining the code, we found that many of the agents try to build a model of
the other agent in the game, based on the history of interactions. As the game pro-
gresses, such an agent’s behavior will come to depend partly on the social preference
of the designer, and partly on the agent’s predictions of the other agent’s behavior.
We surmise that this effect is responsible for the correlations shown in Figure 5.5.
5.4.2 Stationary vs. Non-stationary Strategies
The guess of the previous subsection motivated us to classify and investigate the
agents based on the complexity of their strategies. We divided the agents’ strategies
into two groups, stationary and non-stationary, according to the variance of their
para-SVO:
1. For agents using stationary strategy, given a tester agent, their para-SVOs
remain the same all the time, because their choices at each iteration depend
only on the payoff matrix of current game. They usually have shorter and
simpler codes. For example, some students’ agents use a simple competitive
strategy that choose action A1 when b > c, and choose action A2 otherwise.
We have about 12 agents using stationary strategy among those students’
agents, and the correlation is approximately 0.6 (p¡0.05).
2. For agents using non-stationary strategy, given a tester agent, their para-SVOs
change as the game progresses, because their choices at each iteration depend
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Figure 5.6: Correlation between human SVO and agents using non-stationary strat-
egy.
on the previous history of the interactions. They may build predictive models
of some kind and make some strategic decisions based on the model. For exam-
ple, some students’ agents estimate the probability of the other agent choosing
some kind of action in different situations, and then respond accordingly.
Figure 5.6 shows the correlation of human SVO and para-SVO of agents using
non-stationary strategy. Comparing with the correlation for agents using stationary
strategy (≈ 0.6 for all iteration), the correlation for agents using non-stationary
strategy is lower (ranging from -0.4 to 0.4). This is consistent with our previous
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guess that para-SVOs of agents using non-stationary strategies correlate less with
the social preferences of their designers.
5.5 Utilizing the SVO Information
There are many possible applications of utilizing the SVO information. Having the
SVO information, we can predict the behaviors of the other agents in various situa-
tions, and our agents can interact with them in some better ways. For example, our
agent can avoid possible exploitation by agent that is probably competitive. On the
other hand, if we know that the other agent is possibly cooperative according to the
SVO information, our agent can possibly increase mutual benefits by working closely
with the other agent. If the other agent is neither competitive nor cooperative, our
agent can start with some safe actions and learn a more accurate model of the other
agent from interaction. Using that kind of strategy, we can develop a collaborative
agent to enhance safety and productivity by utilizing the SVO information.
In this section, we present two examples that use the SVO information. First,
we show how we can use the SVO information to composite two simple and non-
adaptive agents to form a better non-adaptive agent. Second, we present how we
can improve an adaptive agent [52] by using the SVO information.
5.5.1 Compositing a Non-adaptive Agent
In this subsection, we present a way to use the data of other agents’ designer to
combine two simple agents to form a better agent. The two agents we used are
80
social agent and maximin agent. Both of them are non-adaptive that they do not
apply any agent-modeling technique during the game. Social agent always chooses
an action that maximizes the sum of payoff of itself and other, so its SVO angle is 45◦
and it performs better if the other agent is also cooperative. Maximin agent always
chooses an action that maximizes its own minimum possible payoff, so its SVO angle
is 0◦ and it can avoid being exploited by other non-cooperative (individualistic or
competitive) agents.
It would be better if we can combine the advantage of both agents in following
way: if the other agent is cooperative, our agent will act like the social agent to
gain the benefit of mutual cooperation; if the other agent is non-cooperative, our
agent will act like the maximin agent to avoid being exploited by them. However,
as we do not know the exact social preference of other agents before interacting
with them, we propose to approximate the social preference of the other agents by
the SVO of their designer. In other words, if the SVO of other agent’s designer is
in the cooperative range (≥ 22.5◦), our agent will act like a social agent; otherwise
(< 22.5◦), our agent will act like a maximin agent.
We implemented the simple agents and the proposed composite agent de-
scribed above, and compared their performance in tournaments (10000 runs) with
the 28 students’ agents. Figure 5.7 and 5.8 shows the average payoffs when the
simple agents play with 21 agents written by cooperative human and 7 agents writ-
ten by individualistic human. Social agent performs better with agents written by
cooperative human, while maximin agent performs better with agents written by
individualistic human. This is so because human SVO is a good approximation of
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Figure 5.7: Performance of the simple agents playing with 21 agents written by
cooperative humans.
the social preference of the agents. Figure 5.9 shows the average payoffs when the
three agents playing with all 28 students’ agents. It shows that the average payoff
of the composite agent is (almost, except one point) always higher than both simple
agents, because it has the strengths of both agents in different situations. The re-
sult also shows that the performances of the simple and composite agents drop when
there is more iterations. It is because some students’ agents apply agent-modeling
technique that they can easily exploit agents using stationary strategies (including
the simple and composite agents) after they have enough interaction data. As we
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Figure 5.8: Performance of the simple agents playing with 7 agents written by
individualistic humans.
shown in Section 5.4.2, if the other agents use non-stationary strategy, designers’
SVO is not enough to model them later in the game. We still need agent-modeling
techniques during interaction to being exploited by those agents.
5.5.2 Improving an Adaptive Agent
In this subsection, we show a way to use the data of other agents’ designer to improve
an adaptive agent that apply agent-modeling techniques. We use the adaptive life
game agent described in Chapter 4. [52] The agent is an automated agent for the
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Figure 5.9: Performance of the simple and composite agents.
life game which performs agent-modeling using an agent model based on the Social
Value Orientation (SVO) theory. In this subsection, we exemplify a way to modify
that agent with the newly discovered SVO correlation results, by providing it the
SVO data of other agent’s designer.
Since the original adaptive agent does not have any prior knowledge about
the other agent, the agent does not know the social preference of the other agent.
Therefore, the agent will start with some default models, and will estimate the
orientation of other agent from the history of interactions. More precisely, the agent
starts by assuming that the other agent is fully cooperative. After accumulating
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some interaction histories, the agent will learn the true social orientation of the other
agent, and will adapt and use it to the best of its capacity (for example, if the other
agent is cooperative, the agent will also be cooperative). To minimize exploitation,
the estimated trustworthiness of the other agent is decreased whenever a defect-
like action is observed. There are five types of trustworthiness: type 0 (fully non-
cooperative), 1, 2, 3, and 4 (fully cooperative). Agents with higher trustworthiness
will tend to cooperate on a larger subset of games.
Although it can prevent future exploitation by decreasing the estimated trust-
worthiness of the other agent whenever a defect-like action is observed, it cannot
prevent the initial exploitation of non-cooperative agents. Avoiding initial exploita-
tion is importance, especially when the expected number of iteration is small. We
propose to use the SVO information of the designer of other agent to minimize the
exploitation by selfish agent. If the designer of other agent has higher SVO angle,
the higher initial estimated trustworthiness of the agent. More precisely, instead of
initializing the estimated trustworthiness (λx) of other agent (x) to fully coopera-








In other words, we have a higher λx value for an agent x written by a designer
having higher SVO angle θx.
To evaluate the performance improvement of the agent with the help of the
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Figure 5.10: Performance of agents playing with all 28 students’ agents.
human SVO data, we implemented a forewarned adaptive agent described above,
and evaluated its performance in tournaments (10000 runs) with students agents.
Figure 5.10 shows the average payoffs the agents at different iteration when they
play with all 28 students’ agents. Figure 5.11 and 5.12 shows the average payoffs
when they play with 21 agents written by cooperative human and 7 agents written
by individualistic human.
The payoff of the original agent is very low at the beginning, because it begins
by assuming the other agent is fully cooperative and so applying the “nice” strategy
towards all other agents. If the other agent is non-cooperative, the original agent
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Figure 5.11: Performance of agents playing with 21 agents written by cooperative
humans.
may be exploited for the first few games, and lose some payoffs at the beginning. On
the other hand, the forewarned adaptive agent has higher payoff at the beginning,
because it prevents some of the exploitation by having a more accurate initial model.
That is also the reason why the payoff difference is very large in Figure 5.12, but
small in Figure 5.11. It also shows that the advantage of forewarned adaptive agent
mainly comes from avoiding being exploited by agents written by individualistic
human. The Human SVO data can help the agent to estimate the trustworthiness
of other agents, rather than learning through interaction.
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Figure 5.12: Performance of agents playing with 7 agents written by individualistic
humans.
Comparing Figure 5.11 and 5.12, the average payoff obtained is higher when
the adaptive agents are playing with students’ agents written by cooperative hu-
mans, because those agents also tend to be more cooperative that give us benefit
of mutual cooperation. This shows that maintaining cooperation with cooperative
agents is very important.
With an increasing number of iterations, both agents’ performances improve
and converge. It is probably because both agents are doing agent modeling. With
more interaction data, the modeling will be more accurate, and so they can better
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predict other agents’ action to get higher payoffs. For example, even though the
original agent always starts with being nice, when it knows more about the other
agents, it will stop cooperating with the defectors and keep cooperating with the
cooperators.
In summary, there are at least three main factors for a good life game agent: (1)
apply agent-modeling techniques during interaction; (2) start with a more accurate
model; (3) maintain mutual cooperation with other agents if possible.
5.6 Summary
We have developed a way to measure the social preferences of computer agents,
by adapting some concepts and techniques from social psychology. In our study
of agents that were designed to play a repeated stochastic game (the life game),
we have found a strong correlation between the agents’ social preferences and the
social preferences of their human designers. We have shown that this correlation
can be used to make useful predictions of what choices an agent will make over the
course of a game, and have shown that these predictions can be used to improve the
performance of other agents that interact with the given agent.
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Chapter 6: Predicting Agents’ Behavior by Measuring their Behav-
ioral Signature
The original SVO model was limited to one-shot games, and assumed that each
individual’s behavioral preferences remain constant over time—an assumption that
is inadequate for repeated-game settings, where an agent’s future behavior may
depend not only on its SVO but also on its observations of the other agents’ behavior.
We extend the SVO model to take this into account. Our experimental evaluation,
on several dozen agents that were written by students in classroom projects, show
that our extended model works quite well.
6.1 Introduction
Many multi-agent domains involve human and computer decision makers that are
engaged in repeated collaborative or competitive activities. Examples include online
auctions, financial trading, and computer gaming. Repeated games are often viewed
as an appropriate model for studying these kinds of repeated interactions between
agents. Compared to one-shot games, repeated games are much more complex as
they allow agent to adapt their behavior between the rounds. The relevant literature
contains many demonstrations of how an agent’s behavior can change as it develops
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a better understanding of the other agents’ behavior. [21,53–56]
In order to model the behavior of an agent and predict its performance, we
adapt and extend a construct, Social Value Orientation (SVO), from social psy-
chology [4]. SVO theory assumes that in interpersonal interactions, an individual’s
choices depend not only on his/her own payoffs but also on his/her preferences for
the other individual’s payoff, and that these preferences remain stable over time.
SVO theory provides a way to measure these preferences, and experimental valida-
tions of these measurements on human subjects.
If a human writes an agent to act as the human’s delegate in a multi-agent
environment, one might expect the computerized agent to have social preferences as
well. Knowing an agent’s social preference would make it possible to make informed
guesses about the agent’s future actions.
A critical limitation of the SVO model is that it only looks at agent’s prefer-
ences in one-shot games. This is inadequate for repeated games, in which an agent’s
actions may depend on both its SVO and its model of the other agent’s behavior.
To use the SVO model effectively in repeated games, it is necessary to extend the
SVO model to take into account how an agent’s behavior will change if it interacts
repeatedly with various other kinds of agents.
Our contributions in this chapter are as follows. First, we extend the SVO
model by developing a behavioral signature, a model of how an agent’s behavior
over time will be affected by both its own SVO and the other agent’s SVO. Second,
we provide methods for using behavioral signatures to predict agents’ performance.
Third, we present experimental results using agents that students wrote to compete
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in repeated-game tournaments. The experimental results show that our predictions
are highly correlated with the agents’ actual performance in tournament settings.
This shows that our proposed model is an effective way to generalize SVO to situa-
tions where agents interact repeatedly.
6.2 Behavioral Signature
In repeated games, an agent’s social preference can be influenced not only by the
agent’s own SVO, but also by how the agent reacts to the other agent’s SVO. For
example, let x be an agent whose SVO is 45◦ (i.e., it prefers equal payoffs for both
agents) and y be a memoryless agent whose SVO is 0◦ (i.e., y cares only about
maximizing its own payoff in the current iteration). If x and y interact repeatedly,
then after repeated observations of y’s behavior, x might decide that the best way to
equalize both agents’ cumulative payoffs might be for x to try to maximize its own
payoff at each iteration. Consequently, if we perform a Ring measurement of x after
it has had many interactions with y, x’s “apparent” SVO value may be closer to 0◦
than 45◦. We called this x’s para-SVO against y in Chapter 5. In this chapter, we
will define a behavioral signature for x to be a vector Θn(x) that includes x’s SVO
and a collection of para-SVO values for x against several different “constant-SVO
agents”:
Θn(x) = 〈θ0(x), θn(x|C−90), θn(x|C−80), θn(x|C−70), ..., θn(x|C90)〉,
where θ0(x) is x’s SVO, and θn(x|Cφ) is x’s para-SVO at the n-th iteration when x
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plays with the agent Cφ defined below.
Each agent Cφ is a memoryless agent whose SVO is φ degrees. Cφ always tries
to maximize the quantity pself cosφ + pother sinφ, where pself is it’s expected payoff
and pother is other agent’s expected payoff if Cφ plays against an agent that chooses
each action with equal probability.1 For example, if φ = 0 and the game matrix is
the one shown in Figure 2.1, the Constant-SVO agent will choose A1 if a+b > c+d,
otherwise it will choose A2.
The para-SVO, θn(x|Cφ), of agent x at the n-th iteration with tester agent
Cφ is measured by applying the modified Ring measurement on the agent at the
(n + 1)-th iteration after it interacted with the tester agent Cφ for n iterations.
Figure 5.3 shows the complete procedure for measuring θn(x|Cφ) using the modified
game matrices GRing (tester agent y = Cφ).
If we know the behavioral signatures of two agents x and y, we can estimate
the cumulative payoff when x and y play with each other. Below, we describe and
evaluate two methods, E0(x, y) and En(x, y), for estimating x’s average payoff when
it plays with y for N iterations (where N > n). Both methods use a EC function to
approximate the payoff. EC [φ1, φ2] is the payoff of Constant-SVO agent Cφ1 when it
plays with another Constant-SVO agent Cφ2 for N total number of iterations. Note
that EC [φ1, φ2] can be computed quickly because the Constant-SVO agents are very
simple.
1The “equal probability” assumption is needed to calculate the expect payoff for each action.
It can be shown that this assumption is compatible with the para-SVO measurement.
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E0 estimation:
E0(x, y) = EC [θ0(x), θ0(y)]
En estimation:
En(x, y) = EC [θn(x|Cβ), θn(y|Cα)],
where α = θ0(x) rounded off to the nearest tens digit, and β = θ0(y) rounded
off to the nearest tens digit.
The first method uses (initial) SVO values of x and y as the input to EC .
The second method uses a more sophisticated input that involves the behavioral
signatures of both agents.2 Note that E0(x, y) is a degenerated case of En(x, y)
when n = 0, because all elements in the behavioral signature equal to SVO of the
agent when n = 0.
6.3 Experiments
For our experimental evaluation, we used a large collection of agents that were
written by students in several advanced-level AI and Game Theory classes. In each
case, the students wrote their agents to compete in a round-robin tournament among
all the agents in their class. To attain a richer set of agents, the classes were held
at two different universities in two different countries: one in the USA, and one in
Israel.
2We also tested another method which uses multiple substitutions. The experimental results
are very similar to the second method (which only one substitution).
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Our experimental studies involved measuring the agents’ behavioral signatures,
playing round-robin tournaments among the entire set of agents, and comparing the
agents’ performance with the predictions made by our model. To eliminate random
favorable payoff variations, we randomized the series of games, and used the same
series between all agents in the population. The instructions stated that at each
iteration, they will be given a symmetric game with a random payoff matrix of
the form shown in Figure 2.1. Following Axelrod’s methodology, we did not tell
the students the exact number of iterations in each life game. The total agent’s
payoff will be the accumulated sum of payoffs with each of the other agents. For
motivational purposes, the project grade was positively correlated with their agents
overall ranking based on their total payoffs in the competition. Overall, we collected
71 agents (47 from the USA and 24 from Israel).
6.3.1 Measuring Agents’ Behavioral Signatures
We use the para-SVO measurement procedure (shown in Figure 5.3) to find the
behavioral signatures of all students’ agents. Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of
(initial) SVO of students’ agents.3 While most of them are individualistic (to dif-
ferent degrees), there were some who had competitive and cooperative orientations.
Figure 6.2 shows the average, over all of the students’ agents, of the para-SVO
value θ10(x|Cφ). Recall that θ10(x|Cφ) is agent x’s para-SVO value at 10th iteration
against a memoryless agent Cφ whose SVO is φ degrees. Notice that the average
3SVO of x is measured by testing x with one-shot games, i.e., it is equals to the initial para-SVO
of x.
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of students’ agents’ SVO.
para-SVO of the students’ agents increases with the para-SVO of the tester agents,
because it is beneficial to be more cooperative if the other agent is more cooperative.
The magnitude of change of the average is not large, because para-SVO values of
about 45 (out of 71) agents remain constant across different tester agents.
Figure 6.3 shows the average para-SVO of students’ agents when the tester
agents are Constant-SVO agents with SVO = −40◦,−20◦, 0◦, 20◦, or 40◦. Again,
the results show that the average para-SVO of the students’ agents increases with
the para-SVO of the tester agents. Moreover, when n increases, most of the averages
decrease, and all of them level off after about 20 iterations. From examining the
code, we found that many of the agents try to build a model of the other agent in
the game, based on the history of interactions, and the model tend to be stabilized
after some number of iterations. All of the above results show that the apparent
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Figure 6.2: Average para-SVO values θ10(x|Cφ) for φ = −90◦ to 90◦, averaged over
all x in the entire set of students’ agents.
social preferences of agents change with the behaviors of other agents, because the
action of an agent is usually determined by both its SVO and its prediction of the
opponent action.
6.3.2 Predicting Agents’ Performances
Our next goal was to evaluate the accuracy of our prediction algorithms. In the
following experiments, the total number of iterations (N) is 100, and the number
of runs is also 100. We predicted the average payoff of all possible games of any
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Figure 6.3: Average para-SVO values θn(x|Cφ) with different tester agents Cφ, av-
eraged over all x in the entire set of students’ agents.
two students’ agents (including playing with itself, i.e., 71× 71 data points for each
run), using the methods mentioned in Section 6.2.
Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 show the correlation and mean square error between
predicted payoffs and actual payoffs. Regardless the value of n, the predicted payoffs
have high correlation with the actual payoffs. Their mean square errors are low,
comparing with the average payoff ≈ 5.5. When n = 0, the accuracy of En is good
(mean square error = 0.284). As n increases, the accuracy of En also increases until
n = 20, at which point it levels off (similar to Figure 6.3).
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Figure 6.4: Correlation between predicted and actual payoffs (when student agents
play in a tournament).
When n = 0, En degenerates to E0 which only considers the (initial) SVO value
of the agents. When n > 0, En takes the agents’ adaptive behaviors into account by
considering their behavioral signatures. The better performance of En shows that
our extended SVO model works better in repeated games than the original SVO
model.
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Figure 6.5: Mean square error of predicted payoffs (when student agents play in a
tournament).
6.4 Summary
We have extended the SVO model from social psychology, to provide a behavioral
signature that models how an agent’s behavior over multiple iterations will depend
on both its own SVO and the SVO of the agent with which it interacts. We have pro-
vided a way to use this behavioral signature to predicting the agent’s performance.
In our study of agents that were designed to play a repeated stochastic game (the
Life Game) in classroom tournaments, the predictions made by our model were
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highly correlated with the agents’ actual performance.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
Human social preferences — i.e., human preferences for the outcomes of their inter-
actions with others — have been shown to play an important role in many areas of
decision-making. As agents are developed that exhibit more autonomy and take an
increasing role in interacting with other human and agents, it is becoming important
to understand the social preferences of agents as well as humans. This dissertation
presents a step in this direction, by studying how the notion of SVO can be used to
improve our understanding of the behavior of computer agents.
This chapter summarizes the contributions in this dissertation and proposes
new directions for future work. The four main contributions of this thesis are:
1. Chapter 3 described a formal model that combines game-theoretical analyses
for cooperation in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with insights from social and
behavioral sciences. Our model is not claimed to be the most accurate account
of social orientations; rather, it is a simple model that takes the first step
in the above direction. Unlike existing models, this formalism captures the
notion of prosocial vs. proself orientations exhibited in human behavior and
explicitly provides an abstract representation for how a player develops its
strategies in repeated games. We have presented theorems showing how players
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with different social tendencies interact. Our theorems identify five general
steady-state behavioral patterns, that can be explained in terms of the players’
social orientation values. We have also performed an experimental evaluation
of our model using evolutionary simulations in the well-known IPD game.
The results of the experiments demonstrated that our model captures the
well-known behavior patterns in IPD. Furthermore, it allows modeling richer
behavior patterns since it does not depend on the particular game matrix.
2. Chapter 4 described a successful strategy for the life game by utilizing SVO
theory. Our method of agent modeling can be used to learn strategies and re-
spond to others’ strategies over time, to play the game well. Our experiments
demonstrated that our SVO based agent outperformed both standard repeated
games strategies and a large set of peer designed agents. Furthermore, our ex-
perimental work illustrates the importance of adaptive and fine-grained oppo-
nent modeling, as well as the impacts that different trust adaptation strategies
have on the performance of the SVO agent.
3. In Chapter 5, we have developed a way to measure the social preferences
of computer agents, by adapting some concepts and techniques from social
psychology. In our study of agents that were designed to play the life game,
we have found a strong correlation between the agents’ social preferences and
the social preferences of their human designers. We have shown that this
correlation can be used to make useful predictions of what choices an agent
will make over the course of a game, and have shown that these predictions
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can be used to improve the performance of other agents that interact with the
given agent.
4. In Chapter 6, we have extended the SVO model, to provide a behavioral signa-
ture that models how an agent’s behavior over multiple iterations will depend
on both its own SVO and the SVO of the agent with which it interacts. We
have provided a way to measure an agent’s behavioral signature, and a way
to use this behavioral signature to predicting the agent’s performance. In our
study of agents that were designed to play the life game in classroom tour-
naments, the predictions made by our model were highly correlated with the
agents’ actual performance.
There are several ways in which this work is both novel and significant. First,
this is one of the first works to investigate the behavior of agents in repeated games
where the stage game varies stochastically at each iteration. Many of the techniques
used in ordinary repeated games depend on having the same game at each iteration,
hence require extensive alteration (if they can be used at all) if the game varies
stochastically. Second, this work shows how a concept from social psychology—
namely, the concept of SVO—can successfully be adapted to model and predict the
behavior of computerized agents in game-theoretic environments. It is possible that
we can further improve our understanding of the behavior of computer agents by
borrowing other well-established theories from psychology (such as expectancy the-
ory [57], inequity aversion [40]). Third, this work provides a way to take the SVO
concept—which was originally developed to model situations where two individuals
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have a single game-theoretic interaction—and extend it to situations in which the in-
dividuals interact repeatedly in a variety of game-theoretic settings. This extension
is important because repeated interactions in different settings are very common in
many real-world applications.
A limitation to most of the above works is that they were restricted to the
life game. However, we believe there is a strong potential for extending the results
to other contexts. One topic of future work would be to generalize our model and
analysis to other kinds of repeated games. Another limitation of our study is that
the algorithm for measuring an agent’s behavioral signature requires a collection of
interaction trace between the agent and a specific group of agents in some special
sequences of games. An interesting direction would be to estimate the behavioral
signatures of agents using a set of interaction traces produced by different pairs of
agents in arbitrary two-player repeated games. Such extensions may provide both
an improved understanding of agent behavior, and ways to improve the effectiveness
of agents in their interactions with others.
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